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Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001/*
2 * The RSA public-key cryptosystem
3 *
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda658a402015-01-23 09:45:19 +00004 * Copyright (C) 2006-2014, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
Paul Bakkerb96f1542010-07-18 20:36:00 +00005 *
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardfe446432015-03-06 13:17:10 +00006 * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
Paul Bakkerb96f1542010-07-18 20:36:00 +00007 *
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00008 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
9 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
10 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
11 * (at your option) any later version.
12 *
13 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
14 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
15 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
16 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 *
18 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
19 * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
20 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
21 */
22/*
23 * RSA was designed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman.
24 *
25 * http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/rsapaper.pdf
26 * http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap8.pdf
27 */
28
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcef4ad22014-04-29 12:39:06 +020029#if !defined(POLARSSL_CONFIG_FILE)
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000030#include "polarssl/config.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcef4ad22014-04-29 12:39:06 +020031#else
32#include POLARSSL_CONFIG_FILE
33#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000034
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000035#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000036
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000037#include "polarssl/rsa.h"
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +020038#include "polarssl/oid.h"
Paul Bakkerbb51f0c2012-08-23 07:46:58 +000039
Rich Evans00ab4702015-02-06 13:43:58 +000040#include <string.h>
41
Paul Bakkerbb51f0c2012-08-23 07:46:58 +000042#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +000043#include "polarssl/md.h"
Paul Bakkerbb51f0c2012-08-23 07:46:58 +000044#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000045
Rich Evans00ab4702015-02-06 13:43:58 +000046#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000047#include <stdlib.h>
Rich Evans00ab4702015-02-06 13:43:58 +000048#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000049
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +010050#if defined(POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C)
51#include "polarssl/platform.h"
52#else
Rich Evans00ab4702015-02-06 13:43:58 +000053#include <stdio.h>
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +010054#define polarssl_printf printf
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda1cdcd22015-09-03 20:03:15 +020055#define polarssl_malloc malloc
56#define polarssl_free free
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +010057#endif
58
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000059/*
60 * Initialize an RSA context
61 */
62void rsa_init( rsa_context *ctx,
63 int padding,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000064 int hash_id )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000065{
66 memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( rsa_context ) );
67
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard844a4c02014-03-10 21:55:35 +010068 rsa_set_padding( ctx, padding, hash_id );
Paul Bakkerc9965dc2013-09-29 14:58:17 +020069
70#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
71 polarssl_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
72#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000073}
74
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard844a4c02014-03-10 21:55:35 +010075/*
76 * Set padding for an existing RSA context
77 */
78void rsa_set_padding( rsa_context *ctx, int padding, int hash_id )
79{
80 ctx->padding = padding;
81 ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
82}
83
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000084#if defined(POLARSSL_GENPRIME)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000085
86/*
87 * Generate an RSA keypair
88 */
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000089int rsa_gen_key( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +000090 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
91 void *p_rng,
92 unsigned int nbits, int exponent )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000093{
94 int ret;
95 mpi P1, Q1, H, G;
96
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000097 if( f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000098 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000099
Janos Follathd61fc682016-02-23 14:42:48 +0000100 mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 );
101 mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &G );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000102
103 /*
104 * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that:
105 * GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
106 */
107 MPI_CHK( mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) );
108
109 do
110 {
Janos Follathd61fc682016-02-23 14:42:48 +0000111 MPI_CHK( mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, 0,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +0000112 f_rng, p_rng ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000113
Janos Follathd61fc682016-02-23 14:42:48 +0000114 if( nbits % 2 )
Simon Butchere9f84272016-04-15 19:06:59 +0100115 {
Janos Follathd61fc682016-02-23 14:42:48 +0000116 MPI_CHK( mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, ( nbits >> 1 ) + 1, 0,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +0000117 f_rng, p_rng ) );
Simon Butchere9f84272016-04-15 19:06:59 +0100118 }
Janos Follathd61fc682016-02-23 14:42:48 +0000119 else
Simon Butchere9f84272016-04-15 19:06:59 +0100120 {
Janos Follathd61fc682016-02-23 14:42:48 +0000121 MPI_CHK( mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, 0,
122 f_rng, p_rng ) );
Simon Butchere9f84272016-04-15 19:06:59 +0100123 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000124
125 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) == 0 )
126 continue;
127
128 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
129 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) != nbits )
130 continue;
131
132 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
133 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
134 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) );
135 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
136 }
137 while( mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 );
138
139 /*
140 * D = E^-1 mod ((P-1)*(Q-1))
141 * DP = D mod (P - 1)
142 * DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
143 * QP = Q^-1 mod P
144 */
145 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D , &ctx->E, &H ) );
146 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->DP, &ctx->D, &P1 ) );
147 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1 ) );
148 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P ) );
149
150 ctx->len = ( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) + 7 ) >> 3;
151
152cleanup:
153
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000154 mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 ); mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &G );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000155
156 if( ret != 0 )
157 {
158 rsa_free( ctx );
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000159 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000160 }
161
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200162 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000163}
164
Paul Bakker9af723c2014-05-01 13:03:14 +0200165#endif /* POLARSSL_GENPRIME */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000166
167/*
168 * Check a public RSA key
169 */
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000170int rsa_check_pubkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000171{
Paul Bakker37940d9f2009-07-10 22:38:58 +0000172 if( !ctx->N.p || !ctx->E.p )
173 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
174
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200175 if( ( ctx->N.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ||
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000176 ( ctx->E.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000177 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000178
179 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) < 128 ||
Paul Bakkerfe3256e2011-11-25 12:11:43 +0000180 mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) > POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000181 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000182
183 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->E ) < 2 ||
Paul Bakker24f37cc2014-04-30 13:33:35 +0200184 mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000185 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000186
187 return( 0 );
188}
189
190/*
191 * Check a private RSA key
192 */
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000193int rsa_check_privkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000194{
195 int ret;
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000196 mpi PQ, DE, P1, Q1, H, I, G, G2, L1, L2, DP, DQ, QP;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000197
198 if( ( ret = rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) ) != 0 )
199 return( ret );
200
Paul Bakker37940d9f2009-07-10 22:38:58 +0000201 if( !ctx->P.p || !ctx->Q.p || !ctx->D.p )
202 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
203
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000204 mpi_init( &PQ ); mpi_init( &DE ); mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 );
205 mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &I ); mpi_init( &G ); mpi_init( &G2 );
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000206 mpi_init( &L1 ); mpi_init( &L2 ); mpi_init( &DP ); mpi_init( &DQ );
207 mpi_init( &QP );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000208
209 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
210 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &DE, &ctx->D, &ctx->E ) );
211 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
212 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
213 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000214 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
215
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000216 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G2, &P1, &Q1 ) );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200217 MPI_CHK( mpi_div_mpi( &L1, &L2, &H, &G2 ) );
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000218 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &I, &DE, &L1 ) );
219
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000220 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &DP, &ctx->D, &P1 ) );
221 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1 ) );
222 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P ) );
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000223 /*
224 * Check for a valid PKCS1v2 private key
225 */
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000226 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->N ) != 0 ||
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000227 mpi_cmp_mpi( &DP, &ctx->DP ) != 0 ||
228 mpi_cmp_mpi( &DQ, &ctx->DQ ) != 0 ||
229 mpi_cmp_mpi( &QP, &ctx->QP ) != 0 ||
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000230 mpi_cmp_int( &L2, 0 ) != 0 ||
231 mpi_cmp_int( &I, 1 ) != 0 ||
232 mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000233 {
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000234 ret = POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000235 }
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200236
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000237cleanup:
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000238 mpi_free( &PQ ); mpi_free( &DE ); mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 );
239 mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &I ); mpi_free( &G ); mpi_free( &G2 );
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000240 mpi_free( &L1 ); mpi_free( &L2 ); mpi_free( &DP ); mpi_free( &DQ );
241 mpi_free( &QP );
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000242
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000243 if( ret == POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED )
244 return( ret );
245
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000246 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000247 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000248
249 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000250}
251
252/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2f8d1f92014-11-06 14:02:51 +0100253 * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match
254 */
255int rsa_check_pub_priv( const rsa_context *pub, const rsa_context *prv )
256{
257 if( rsa_check_pubkey( pub ) != 0 ||
258 rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 )
259 {
260 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
261 }
262
263 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->N, &prv->N ) != 0 ||
264 mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->E, &prv->E ) != 0 )
265 {
266 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
267 }
268
269 return( 0 );
270}
271
272/*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000273 * Do an RSA public key operation
274 */
275int rsa_public( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000276 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000277 unsigned char *output )
278{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000279 int ret;
280 size_t olen;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000281 mpi T;
282
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000283 mpi_init( &T );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000284
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200285#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
286 if( ( ret = polarssl_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
287 return( ret );
288#endif
289
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000290 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
291
292 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
293 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200294 ret = POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
295 goto cleanup;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000296 }
297
298 olen = ctx->len;
299 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
300 MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
301
302cleanup:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard88fca3e2015-03-27 15:06:07 +0100303#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200304 if( polarssl_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
305 return( POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard88fca3e2015-03-27 15:06:07 +0100306#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000307
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000308 mpi_free( &T );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000309
310 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000311 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000312
313 return( 0 );
314}
315
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200316/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200317 * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of:
318 * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
319 * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’96. Springer
320 * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200321 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200322static int rsa_prepare_blinding( rsa_context *ctx,
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200323 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
324{
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard4d89c7e2013-10-04 15:18:38 +0200325 int ret, count = 0;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200326
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200327 if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL )
328 {
329 /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
330 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard735b8fc2013-09-13 12:57:23 +0200331 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200332 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard735b8fc2013-09-13 12:57:23 +0200333 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200334
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200335 goto cleanup;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200336 }
337
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard4d89c7e2013-10-04 15:18:38 +0200338 /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
339 do {
340 if( count++ > 10 )
341 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED );
342
343 MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
344 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
345 } while( mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200346
347 /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N */
348 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
349 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
350
351cleanup:
352 return( ret );
353}
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200354
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000355/*
356 * Do an RSA private key operation
357 */
358int rsa_private( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200359 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
360 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000361 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000362 unsigned char *output )
363{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000364 int ret;
365 size_t olen;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000366 mpi T, T1, T2;
367
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000368 mpi_init( &T ); mpi_init( &T1 ); mpi_init( &T2 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000369
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200370#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
371 if( ( ret = polarssl_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 )
372 return( ret );
373#endif
374
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000375 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000376 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
377 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200378 ret = POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
379 goto cleanup;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000380 }
381
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200382 if( f_rng != NULL )
383 {
384 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200385 * Blinding
386 * T = T * Vi mod N
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200387 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200388 MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) );
389 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200390 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200391 }
Paul Bakkeraab30c12013-08-30 11:00:25 +0200392
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde10e06d2014-11-06 18:15:12 +0100393#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
394 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
395#else
Paul Bakkeraab30c12013-08-30 11:00:25 +0200396 /*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000397 * faster decryption using the CRT
398 *
399 * T1 = input ^ dP mod P
400 * T2 = input ^ dQ mod Q
401 */
402 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T1, &T, &ctx->DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
403 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T2, &T, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) );
404
405 /*
406 * T = (T1 - T2) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
407 */
408 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T1, &T2 ) );
409 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->QP ) );
410 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T1, &ctx->P ) );
411
412 /*
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200413 * T = T2 + T * Q
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000414 */
415 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->Q ) );
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200416 MPI_CHK( mpi_add_mpi( &T, &T2, &T1 ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde10e06d2014-11-06 18:15:12 +0100417#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT */
Paul Bakkeraab30c12013-08-30 11:00:25 +0200418
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200419 if( f_rng != NULL )
420 {
421 /*
422 * Unblind
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200423 * T = T * Vf mod N
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200424 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200425 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) );
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200426 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
427 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000428
429 olen = ctx->len;
430 MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
431
432cleanup:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde10e06d2014-11-06 18:15:12 +0100433#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200434 if( polarssl_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 )
435 return( POLARSSL_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200436#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5efed092015-08-31 10:03:16 +0200437
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard88fca3e2015-03-27 15:06:07 +0100438 mpi_free( &T ); mpi_free( &T1 ); mpi_free( &T2 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000439
440 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000441 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000442
443 return( 0 );
444}
445
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000446#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
447/**
448 * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
449 *
Paul Bakkerb125ed82011-11-10 13:33:51 +0000450 * \param dst buffer to mask
451 * \param dlen length of destination buffer
452 * \param src source of the mask generation
453 * \param slen length of the source buffer
454 * \param md_ctx message digest context to use
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000455 */
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200456static void mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src,
457 size_t slen, md_context_t *md_ctx )
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000458{
459 unsigned char mask[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
460 unsigned char counter[4];
461 unsigned char *p;
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000462 unsigned int hlen;
463 size_t i, use_len;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000464
465 memset( mask, 0, POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE );
466 memset( counter, 0, 4 );
467
468 hlen = md_ctx->md_info->size;
469
470 // Generate and apply dbMask
471 //
472 p = dst;
473
474 while( dlen > 0 )
475 {
476 use_len = hlen;
477 if( dlen < hlen )
478 use_len = dlen;
479
480 md_starts( md_ctx );
481 md_update( md_ctx, src, slen );
482 md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 );
483 md_finish( md_ctx, mask );
484
485 for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i )
486 *p++ ^= mask[i];
487
488 counter[3]++;
489
490 dlen -= use_len;
491 }
492}
Paul Bakker9af723c2014-05-01 13:03:14 +0200493#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000494
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100495#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
496/*
497 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
498 */
499int rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
500 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
501 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100502 int mode,
503 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
504 size_t ilen,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100505 const unsigned char *input,
506 unsigned char *output )
507{
508 size_t olen;
509 int ret;
510 unsigned char *p = output;
511 unsigned int hlen;
512 const md_info_t *md_info;
513 md_context_t md_ctx;
514
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +0200515 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
516 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
517
518 if( f_rng == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100519 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
520
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda2733712015-02-10 17:32:14 +0100521 md_info = md_info_from_type( (md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100522 if( md_info == NULL )
523 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
524
525 olen = ctx->len;
526 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
527
Janos Follath742783f2016-02-08 14:52:29 +0000528 // first comparison checks for overflow
529 if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100530 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
531
532 memset( output, 0, olen );
533
534 *p++ = 0;
535
536 // Generate a random octet string seed
537 //
538 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 )
539 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
540
541 p += hlen;
542
543 // Construct DB
544 //
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100545 md( md_info, label, label_len, p );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100546 p += hlen;
547 p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
548 *p++ = 1;
549 memcpy( p, input, ilen );
550
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +0200551 md_init( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100552 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
553
554 // maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
555 //
556 mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
557 &md_ctx );
558
559 // maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed
560 //
561 mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
562 &md_ctx );
563
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +0200564 md_free( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100565
566 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
567 ? rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200568 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100569}
570#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
571
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200572#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100573/*
574 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
575 */
576int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
577 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
578 void *p_rng,
579 int mode, size_t ilen,
580 const unsigned char *input,
581 unsigned char *output )
582{
583 size_t nb_pad, olen;
584 int ret;
585 unsigned char *p = output;
586
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +0200587 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
588 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
589
Janos Follath7ddc2cd2016-03-18 11:45:44 +0000590 // We don't check p_rng because it won't be dereferenced here
591 if( f_rng == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100592 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
593
594 olen = ctx->len;
595
Janos Follath742783f2016-02-08 14:52:29 +0000596 // first comparison checks for overflow
597 if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100598 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
599
600 nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
601
602 *p++ = 0;
603 if( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
604 {
605 *p++ = RSA_CRYPT;
606
607 while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
608 {
609 int rng_dl = 100;
610
611 do {
612 ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 );
613 } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 );
614
615 // Check if RNG failed to generate data
616 //
Paul Bakker66d5d072014-06-17 16:39:18 +0200617 if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 )
Paul Bakkerd8bb8262014-06-17 14:06:49 +0200618 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100619
620 p++;
621 }
622 }
623 else
624 {
625 *p++ = RSA_SIGN;
626
627 while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
628 *p++ = 0xFF;
629 }
630
631 *p++ = 0;
632 memcpy( p, input, ilen );
633
634 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
635 ? rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200636 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100637}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200638#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100639
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000640/*
641 * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
642 */
643int rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +0000644 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +0000645 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000646 int mode, size_t ilen,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000647 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000648 unsigned char *output )
649{
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000650 switch( ctx->padding )
651 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200652#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000653 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100654 return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen,
655 input, output );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200656#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000657
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000658#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
659 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100660 return rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
661 ilen, input, output );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000662#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000663
664 default:
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000665 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000666 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000667}
668
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100669#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000670/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100671 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000672 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100673int rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200674 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
675 void *p_rng,
676 int mode,
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100677 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
678 size_t *olen,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100679 const unsigned char *input,
680 unsigned char *output,
681 size_t output_max_len )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000682{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000683 int ret;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100684 size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
685 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done;
Paul Bakker0be82f22012-10-03 20:36:33 +0000686 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000687 unsigned char lhash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000688 unsigned int hlen;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000689 const md_info_t *md_info;
690 md_context_t md_ctx;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100691
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100692 /*
693 * Parameters sanity checks
694 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +0200695 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100696 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000697
698 ilen = ctx->len;
699
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000700 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000701 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000702
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda2733712015-02-10 17:32:14 +0100703 md_info = md_info_from_type( (md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100704 if( md_info == NULL )
705 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
706
Simon Butcherd3253b02016-03-17 00:57:18 +0000707 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Janos Follath092f2c42016-02-11 11:08:18 +0000708
709 // checking for integer underflow
710 if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen )
Simon Butcherd3253b02016-03-17 00:57:18 +0000711 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Janos Follath092f2c42016-02-11 11:08:18 +0000712
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100713 /*
714 * RSA operation
715 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000716 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
717 ? rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200718 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000719
720 if( ret != 0 )
721 return( ret );
722
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100723 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100724 * Unmask data and generate lHash
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100725 */
726 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
727
Janos Follath3bed13d2016-02-09 14:51:35 +0000728 // checking for integer underflow
729 if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen )
730 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
731
Simon Butcherd3253b02016-03-17 00:57:18 +0000732 md_init( &md_ctx );
733 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100734
735 /* Generate lHash */
736 md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash );
737
738 /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
739 mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
740 &md_ctx );
741
742 /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
743 mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
744 &md_ctx );
745
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +0200746 md_free( &md_ctx );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100747
748 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100749 * Check contents, in "constant-time"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100750 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000751 p = buf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100752 bad = 0;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000753
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100754 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100755
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100756 p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100757
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100758 /* Check lHash */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100759 for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ )
760 bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100761
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100762 /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
763 * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
764 pad_len = 0;
765 pad_done = 0;
766 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ )
767 {
768 pad_done |= p[i];
Pascal Junodb99183d2015-03-11 16:49:45 +0100769 pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100770 }
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100771
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100772 p += pad_len;
773 bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100774
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100775 /*
776 * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not
777 * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the
778 * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
779 * the different error conditions.
780 */
781 if( bad != 0 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100782 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
783
Paul Bakker66d5d072014-06-17 16:39:18 +0200784 if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100785 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
786
787 *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
788 memcpy( output, p, *olen );
789
790 return( 0 );
791}
792#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
793
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200794#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100795/*
796 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
797 */
798int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200799 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
800 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100801 int mode, size_t *olen,
802 const unsigned char *input,
803 unsigned char *output,
804 size_t output_max_len)
805{
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100806 int ret;
807 size_t ilen, pad_count = 0, i;
808 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100809 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
810
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +0200811 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100812 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
813
814 ilen = ctx->len;
815
816 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
817 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
818
819 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
820 ? rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200821 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100822
823 if( ret != 0 )
824 return( ret );
825
826 p = buf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100827 bad = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100828
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100829 /*
830 * Check and get padding len in "constant-time"
831 */
832 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100833
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100834 /* This test does not depend on secret data */
835 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000836 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100837 bad |= *p++ ^ RSA_CRYPT;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000838
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100839 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
840 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
841 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
842 {
Pascal Junodb99183d2015-03-11 16:49:45 +0100843 pad_done |= ((p[i] | (unsigned char)-p[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
844 pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100845 }
Paul Bakkere6ee41f2012-05-19 08:43:48 +0000846
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100847 p += pad_count;
848 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100849 }
850 else
851 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100852 bad |= *p++ ^ RSA_SIGN;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100853
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100854 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
855 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
856 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
857 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardfbf09152014-02-03 11:58:55 +0100858 pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100859 pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
860 }
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100861
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100862 p += pad_count;
863 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000864 }
865
Janos Follathf18263d2016-02-12 13:30:09 +0000866 bad |= ( pad_count < 8 );
Janos Follathf570f7f2016-02-08 13:59:25 +0000867
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100868 if( bad )
Paul Bakker8804f692013-02-28 18:06:26 +0100869 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
870
Paul Bakker66d5d072014-06-17 16:39:18 +0200871 if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len )
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000872 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
Paul Bakker060c5682009-01-12 21:48:39 +0000873
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000874 *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000875 memcpy( output, p, *olen );
876
877 return( 0 );
878}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200879#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000880
881/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100882 * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
883 */
884int rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200885 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
886 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100887 int mode, size_t *olen,
888 const unsigned char *input,
889 unsigned char *output,
890 size_t output_max_len)
891{
892 switch( ctx->padding )
893 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200894#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100895 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200896 return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen,
897 input, output, output_max_len );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200898#endif
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100899
900#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
901 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200902 return rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
903 olen, input, output,
904 output_max_len );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100905#endif
906
907 default:
908 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
909 }
910}
911
912#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
913/*
914 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
915 */
916int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
917 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
918 void *p_rng,
919 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200920 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100921 unsigned int hashlen,
922 const unsigned char *hash,
923 unsigned char *sig )
924{
925 size_t olen;
926 unsigned char *p = sig;
927 unsigned char salt[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
928 unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0;
929 int ret;
930 size_t msb;
931 const md_info_t *md_info;
932 md_context_t md_ctx;
933
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +0200934 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
935 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
936
937 if( f_rng == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100938 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
939
940 olen = ctx->len;
941
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200942 if( md_alg != POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100943 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200944 // Gather length of hash to sign
945 //
946 md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
947 if( md_info == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100948 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200949
950 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100951 }
952
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda2733712015-02-10 17:32:14 +0100953 md_info = md_info_from_type( (md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100954 if( md_info == NULL )
955 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
956
957 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
958 slen = hlen;
959
960 if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 )
961 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
962
963 memset( sig, 0, olen );
964
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100965 // Generate salt of length slen
966 //
967 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
968 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
969
970 // Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits
971 //
972 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
973 p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
974 *p++ = 0x01;
975 memcpy( p, salt, slen );
976 p += slen;
977
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +0200978 md_init( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100979 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
980
981 // Generate H = Hash( M' )
982 //
983 md_starts( &md_ctx );
984 md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 );
985 md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
986 md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen );
987 md_finish( &md_ctx, p );
988
989 // Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
990 //
991 if( msb % 8 == 0 )
992 offset = 1;
993
994 // maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
995 //
996 mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, &md_ctx );
997
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +0200998 md_free( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100999
1000 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
1001 sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb );
1002
1003 p += hlen;
1004 *p++ = 0xBC;
1005
1006 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1007 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001008 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001009}
1010#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
1011
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001012#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001013/*
1014 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
1015 */
1016/*
1017 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
1018 */
1019int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001020 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1021 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001022 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001023 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001024 unsigned int hashlen,
1025 const unsigned char *hash,
1026 unsigned char *sig )
1027{
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001028 size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001029 unsigned char *p = sig;
Paul Bakker21e081b2014-07-24 10:38:01 +02001030 const char *oid = NULL;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda1cdcd22015-09-03 20:03:15 +02001031 unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL;
1032 size_t i;
1033 unsigned char diff;
1034 volatile unsigned char diff_no_optimize;
1035 int ret;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001036
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +02001037 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001038 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1039
1040 olen = ctx->len;
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001041 nb_pad = olen - 3;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001042
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001043 if( md_alg != POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001044 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001045 const md_info_t *md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
1046 if( md_info == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001047 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001048
Paul Bakker1c3853b2013-09-10 11:43:44 +02001049 if( oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 )
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001050 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1051
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001052 nb_pad -= 10 + oid_size;
1053
1054 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001055 }
1056
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001057 nb_pad -= hashlen;
1058
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001059 if( ( nb_pad < 8 ) || ( nb_pad > olen ) )
1060 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1061
1062 *p++ = 0;
1063 *p++ = RSA_SIGN;
1064 memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad );
1065 p += nb_pad;
1066 *p++ = 0;
1067
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001068 if( md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001069 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001070 memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
1071 }
1072 else
1073 {
1074 /*
1075 * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
1076 * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
1077 * digest Digest }
1078 *
1079 * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
1080 *
1081 * Digest ::= OCTET STRING
1082 */
1083 *p++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE | ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
Paul Bakkerb9cfaa02013-10-11 18:58:55 +02001084 *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001085 *p++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE | ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
Paul Bakkerb9cfaa02013-10-11 18:58:55 +02001086 *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x04 + oid_size );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001087 *p++ = ASN1_OID;
Paul Bakkerb9cfaa02013-10-11 18:58:55 +02001088 *p++ = oid_size & 0xFF;
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001089 memcpy( p, oid, oid_size );
1090 p += oid_size;
1091 *p++ = ASN1_NULL;
1092 *p++ = 0x00;
1093 *p++ = ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
1094 *p++ = hashlen;
1095 memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001096 }
1097
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda1cdcd22015-09-03 20:03:15 +02001098 if( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1099 return( rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) );
1100
1101 /*
1102 * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a
1103 * temporary buffer and check it before returning it.
1104 */
1105 sig_try = polarssl_malloc( ctx->len );
Simon Butcher7d3f3a82016-01-02 00:03:39 +00001106 if( sig_try == NULL )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda1cdcd22015-09-03 20:03:15 +02001107 return( POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED );
1108
Simon Butcher7d3f3a82016-01-02 00:03:39 +00001109 verif = polarssl_malloc( ctx->len );
1110 if( verif == NULL )
1111 {
1112 polarssl_free( sig_try );
1113 return( POLARSSL_ERR_MPI_MALLOC_FAILED );
1114 }
1115
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda1cdcd22015-09-03 20:03:15 +02001116 MPI_CHK( rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) );
1117 MPI_CHK( rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) );
1118
1119 /* Compare in constant time just in case */
1120 for( diff = 0, i = 0; i < ctx->len; i++ )
1121 diff |= verif[i] ^ sig[i];
1122 diff_no_optimize = diff;
1123
1124 if( diff_no_optimize != 0 )
1125 {
1126 ret = POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED;
1127 goto cleanup;
1128 }
1129
1130 memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len );
1131
1132cleanup:
1133 polarssl_free( sig_try );
1134 polarssl_free( verif );
1135
1136 return( ret );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001137}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001138#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001139
1140/*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001141 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
1142 */
1143int rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001144 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001145 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001146 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001147 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001148 unsigned int hashlen,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +00001149 const unsigned char *hash,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001150 unsigned char *sig )
1151{
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001152 switch( ctx->padding )
1153 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001154#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001155 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001156 return rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001157 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001158#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001159
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001160#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
1161 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001162 return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001163 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001164#endif
1165
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001166 default:
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001167 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001168 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001169}
1170
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001171#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001172/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001173 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001174 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001175int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( rsa_context *ctx,
1176 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1177 void *p_rng,
1178 int mode,
1179 md_type_t md_alg,
1180 unsigned int hashlen,
1181 const unsigned char *hash,
1182 md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
1183 int expected_salt_len,
1184 const unsigned char *sig )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001185{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001186 int ret;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001187 size_t siglen;
1188 unsigned char *p;
Paul Bakker0be82f22012-10-03 20:36:33 +00001189 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker1fe7d9b2011-11-15 15:26:03 +00001190 unsigned char result[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001191 unsigned char zeros[8];
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001192 unsigned int hlen;
1193 size_t slen, msb;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001194 const md_info_t *md_info;
1195 md_context_t md_ctx;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001196
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +02001197 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001198 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1199
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001200 siglen = ctx->len;
1201
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +00001202 if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001203 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001204
1205 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1206 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001207 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001208
1209 if( ret != 0 )
1210 return( ret );
1211
1212 p = buf;
1213
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001214 if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC )
1215 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1216
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001217 if( md_alg != POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001218 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001219 // Gather length of hash to sign
1220 //
1221 md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
1222 if( md_info == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001223 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001224
1225 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001226 }
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001227
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001228 md_info = md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001229 if( md_info == NULL )
1230 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001231
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001232 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001233 slen = siglen - hlen - 1; /* Currently length of salt + padding */
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001234
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001235 memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
Paul Bakker53019ae2011-03-25 13:58:48 +00001236
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001237 // Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
1238 //
1239 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001240
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001241 // Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
1242 //
1243 if( msb % 8 == 0 )
1244 {
1245 p++;
1246 siglen -= 1;
1247 }
1248 if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
1249 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001250
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +02001251 md_init( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001252 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001253
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001254 mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx );
Paul Bakker02303e82013-01-03 11:08:31 +01001255
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001256 buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001257
Paul Bakker4de44aa2013-12-31 11:43:01 +01001258 while( p < buf + siglen && *p == 0 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001259 p++;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001260
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001261 if( p == buf + siglen ||
1262 *p++ != 0x01 )
1263 {
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +02001264 md_free( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001265 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1266 }
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001267
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001268 /* Actual salt len */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001269 slen -= p - buf;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001270
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001271 if( expected_salt_len != RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY &&
1272 slen != (size_t) expected_salt_len )
1273 {
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +02001274 md_free( &md_ctx );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001275 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1276 }
1277
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001278 // Generate H = Hash( M' )
1279 //
1280 md_starts( &md_ctx );
1281 md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
1282 md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
1283 md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen );
1284 md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
Paul Bakker53019ae2011-03-25 13:58:48 +00001285
Paul Bakker84bbeb52014-07-01 14:53:22 +02001286 md_free( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001287
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001288 if( memcmp( p + slen, result, hlen ) == 0 )
1289 return( 0 );
1290 else
1291 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1292}
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001293
1294/*
1295 * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
1296 */
1297int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
1298 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1299 void *p_rng,
1300 int mode,
1301 md_type_t md_alg,
1302 unsigned int hashlen,
1303 const unsigned char *hash,
1304 const unsigned char *sig )
1305{
1306 md_type_t mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0eaa8be2014-06-05 18:07:20 +02001307 ? (md_type_t) ctx->hash_id
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5ec628a2014-06-03 11:44:06 +02001308 : md_alg;
1309
1310 return( rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode,
1311 md_alg, hashlen, hash,
1312 mgf1_hash_id, RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY,
1313 sig ) );
1314
1315}
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001316#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
Paul Bakker40628ba2013-01-03 10:50:31 +01001317
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001318#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001319/*
1320 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
1321 */
1322int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001323 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1324 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001325 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001326 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001327 unsigned int hashlen,
1328 const unsigned char *hash,
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcc0a9d02013-08-12 11:34:35 +02001329 const unsigned char *sig )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001330{
1331 int ret;
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001332 size_t len, siglen, asn1_len;
1333 unsigned char *p, *end;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001334 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001335 md_type_t msg_md_alg;
1336 const md_info_t *md_info;
1337 asn1_buf oid;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001338
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarde6d1d822014-06-02 16:47:02 +02001339 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001340 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1341
1342 siglen = ctx->len;
1343
1344 if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
1345 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1346
1347 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1348 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001349 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001350
1351 if( ret != 0 )
1352 return( ret );
1353
1354 p = buf;
1355
1356 if( *p++ != 0 || *p++ != RSA_SIGN )
1357 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1358
1359 while( *p != 0 )
1360 {
1361 if( p >= buf + siglen - 1 || *p != 0xFF )
1362 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1363 p++;
1364 }
1365 p++;
1366
1367 len = siglen - ( p - buf );
1368
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001369 if( len == hashlen && md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001370 {
1371 if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) == 0 )
1372 return( 0 );
1373 else
1374 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001375 }
1376
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001377 md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
1378 if( md_info == NULL )
1379 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1380 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
1381
1382 end = p + len;
1383
1384 // Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure
1385 //
1386 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
1387 ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
1388 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1389
1390 if( asn1_len + 2 != len )
1391 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1392
1393 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
1394 ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
1395 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1396
1397 if( asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len )
1398 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1399
1400 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &oid.len, ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
1401 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1402
1403 oid.p = p;
1404 p += oid.len;
1405
1406 if( oid_get_md_alg( &oid, &msg_md_alg ) != 0 )
1407 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1408
1409 if( md_alg != msg_md_alg )
1410 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1411
1412 /*
1413 * assume the algorithm parameters must be NULL
1414 */
1415 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 )
1416 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1417
1418 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
1419 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1420
1421 if( asn1_len != hashlen )
1422 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1423
1424 if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) != 0 )
1425 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1426
1427 p += hashlen;
1428
1429 if( p != end )
1430 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1431
1432 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001433}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001434#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001435
1436/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001437 * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
1438 */
1439int rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001440 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1441 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001442 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001443 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001444 unsigned int hashlen,
1445 const unsigned char *hash,
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcc0a9d02013-08-12 11:34:35 +02001446 const unsigned char *sig )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001447{
1448 switch( ctx->padding )
1449 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001450#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001451 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001452 return rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001453 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001454#endif
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001455
1456#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
1457 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001458 return rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001459 hashlen, hash, sig );
1460#endif
1461
1462 default:
1463 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1464 }
1465}
1466
1467/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard3053f5b2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02001468 * Copy the components of an RSA key
1469 */
1470int rsa_copy( rsa_context *dst, const rsa_context *src )
1471{
1472 int ret;
1473
1474 dst->ver = src->ver;
1475 dst->len = src->len;
1476
1477 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) );
1478 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->E, &src->E ) );
1479
1480 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->D, &src->D ) );
1481 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->P, &src->P ) );
1482 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->Q, &src->Q ) );
1483 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->DP, &src->DP ) );
1484 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->DQ, &src->DQ ) );
1485 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->QP, &src->QP ) );
1486
1487 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->RN, &src->RN ) );
1488 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->RP, &src->RP ) );
1489 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->RQ, &src->RQ ) );
1490
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +02001491 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->Vi, &src->Vi ) );
1492 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->Vf, &src->Vf ) );
1493
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard3053f5b2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02001494 dst->padding = src->padding;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardfdddac92014-03-25 15:58:35 +01001495 dst->hash_id = src->hash_id;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard3053f5b2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02001496
1497cleanup:
1498 if( ret != 0 )
1499 rsa_free( dst );
1500
1501 return( ret );
1502}
1503
1504/*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001505 * Free the components of an RSA key
1506 */
1507void rsa_free( rsa_context *ctx )
1508{
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +02001509 mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); mpi_free( &ctx->Vf );
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +00001510 mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); mpi_free( &ctx->RN );
1511 mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); mpi_free( &ctx->DP );
1512 mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); mpi_free( &ctx->P ); mpi_free( &ctx->D );
1513 mpi_free( &ctx->E ); mpi_free( &ctx->N );
Paul Bakkerc9965dc2013-09-29 14:58:17 +02001514
1515#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
1516 polarssl_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
1517#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001518}
1519
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001520#if defined(POLARSSL_SELF_TEST)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001521
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001522#include "polarssl/sha1.h"
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001523
1524/*
1525 * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
1526 */
1527#define KEY_LEN 128
1528
1529#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
1530 "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
1531 "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
1532 "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
1533 "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
1534 "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
1535 "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
1536 "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
1537
1538#define RSA_E "10001"
1539
1540#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
1541 "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
1542 "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
1543 "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
1544 "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
1545 "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
1546 "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
1547 "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
1548
1549#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
1550 "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
1551 "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
1552 "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
1553
1554#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
1555 "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
1556 "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
1557 "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
1558
1559#define RSA_DP "C1ACF567564274FB07A0BBAD5D26E298" \
1560 "3C94D22288ACD763FD8E5600ED4A702D" \
1561 "F84198A5F06C2E72236AE490C93F07F8" \
1562 "3CC559CD27BC2D1CA488811730BB5725"
1563
1564#define RSA_DQ "4959CBF6F8FEF750AEE6977C155579C7" \
1565 "D8AAEA56749EA28623272E4F7D0592AF" \
1566 "7C1F1313CAC9471B5C523BFE592F517B" \
1567 "407A1BD76C164B93DA2D32A383E58357"
1568
1569#define RSA_QP "9AE7FBC99546432DF71896FC239EADAE" \
1570 "F38D18D2B2F0E2DD275AA977E2BF4411" \
1571 "F5A3B2A5D33605AEBBCCBA7FEB9F2D2F" \
1572 "A74206CEC169D74BF5A8C50D6F48EA08"
1573
1574#define PT_LEN 24
1575#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
1576 "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
1577
Paul Bakkerfef3c5a2013-12-11 13:36:30 +01001578#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001579static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001580{
Paul Bakkerf96f7b62014-04-30 16:02:38 +02001581#if !defined(__OpenBSD__)
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001582 size_t i;
1583
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001584 if( rng_state != NULL )
1585 rng_state = NULL;
1586
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001587 for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
1588 output[i] = rand();
Paul Bakkerf96f7b62014-04-30 16:02:38 +02001589#else
1590 if( rng_state != NULL )
1591 rng_state = NULL;
1592
1593 arc4random_buf( output, len );
1594#endif /* !OpenBSD */
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001595
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001596 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001597}
Paul Bakker9af723c2014-05-01 13:03:14 +02001598#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001599
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001600/*
1601 * Checkup routine
1602 */
1603int rsa_self_test( int verbose )
1604{
Paul Bakker3d8fb632014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001605 int ret = 0;
Paul Bakkerfef3c5a2013-12-11 13:36:30 +01001606#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001607 size_t len;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001608 rsa_context rsa;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001609 unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
1610 unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
1611 unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001612#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
1613 unsigned char sha1sum[20];
1614#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001615
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +00001616 rsa_init( &rsa, RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001617
1618 rsa.len = KEY_LEN;
Paul Bakker3d8fb632014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001619 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.N , 16, RSA_N ) );
1620 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.E , 16, RSA_E ) );
1621 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.D , 16, RSA_D ) );
1622 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.P , 16, RSA_P ) );
1623 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.Q , 16, RSA_Q ) );
1624 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.DP, 16, RSA_DP ) );
1625 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.DQ, 16, RSA_DQ ) );
1626 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_string( &rsa.QP, 16, RSA_QP ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001627
1628 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001629 polarssl_printf( " RSA key validation: " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001630
1631 if( rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 ||
1632 rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 )
1633 {
1634 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001635 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001636
1637 return( 1 );
1638 }
1639
1640 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001641 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001642
1643 memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN );
1644
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001645 if( rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, PT_LEN,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001646 rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1647 {
1648 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001649 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001650
1651 return( 1 );
1652 }
1653
1654 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001655 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001656
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001657 if( rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, RSA_PRIVATE, &len,
Paul Bakker060c5682009-01-12 21:48:39 +00001658 rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001659 sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001660 {
1661 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001662 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001663
1664 return( 1 );
1665 }
1666
1667 if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 )
1668 {
1669 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001670 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001671
1672 return( 1 );
1673 }
1674
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001675#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001676 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001677 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 data sign : " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001678
1679 sha1( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum );
1680
Paul Bakkeraab30c12013-08-30 11:00:25 +02001681 if( rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL, RSA_PRIVATE, POLARSSL_MD_SHA1, 0,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001682 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1683 {
1684 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001685 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001686
1687 return( 1 );
1688 }
1689
1690 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001691 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001692
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001693 if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, POLARSSL_MD_SHA1, 0,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001694 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1695 {
1696 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001697 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001698
1699 return( 1 );
1700 }
1701
1702 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001703 polarssl_printf( "passed\n\n" );
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001704#endif /* POLARSSL_SHA1_C */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001705
Paul Bakker3d8fb632014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001706cleanup:
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001707 rsa_free( &rsa );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001708#else /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker3e41fe82013-09-15 17:42:50 +02001709 ((void) verbose);
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001710#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker3d8fb632014-04-17 12:42:41 +02001711 return( ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001712}
1713
Paul Bakker9af723c2014-05-01 13:03:14 +02001714#endif /* POLARSSL_SELF_TEST */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001715
Paul Bakker9af723c2014-05-01 13:03:14 +02001716#endif /* POLARSSL_RSA_C */