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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001/**
Darryl Greena40a1012018-01-05 15:33:17 +00002 * \file ssl_internal.h
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02003 *
4 * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules
Darryl Greena40a1012018-01-05 15:33:17 +00005 */
6/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard6fb81872015-07-27 11:11:48 +02007 * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard37ff1402015-09-04 14:21:07 +02008 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
9 *
10 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
11 * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
12 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
13 *
14 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
15 *
16 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
17 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
18 * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
19 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
20 * limitations under the License.
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020021 *
22 * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020023 */
24#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
25#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
26
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050027#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010028#include "mbedtls/config.h"
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050029#else
30#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
31#endif
32
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010033#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
34#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020035
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -050036#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
37#include "psa/crypto.h"
38#endif
39
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020040#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010041#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020042#endif
43
44#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010045#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020046#endif
47
48#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010049#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020050#endif
51
52#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010053#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020054#endif
55
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +020056#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010057#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +020058#endif
59
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000060#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
61#include "psa/crypto.h"
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010062#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000063#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
64
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0223ab92015-10-05 11:40:01 +010065#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
66 !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020067#define inline __inline
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard20af64d2015-07-07 18:33:39 +020068#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020069
70/* Determine minimum supported version */
71#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
72
73#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
74#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0
75#else
76#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
77#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
78#else
79#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
80#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2
81#else
82#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
83#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
84#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
85#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
86#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */
87#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
88
Ron Eldor5e9f14d2017-05-28 10:46:38 +030089#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
90#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
91
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020092/* Determine maximum supported version */
93#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
94
95#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
96#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
97#else
98#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
99#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2
100#else
101#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
102#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
103#else
104#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
105#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0
106#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
107#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */
108#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
109#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
110
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard862cde52017-05-17 11:56:15 +0200111/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200112#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
113 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
114 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
115 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100116#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200117#endif
118
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200119#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0
120#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */
121#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */
122#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */
123
124/*
125 * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4
126 *
127 * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends,
128 * but is distinct for resends.
129 *
130 * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway.
131 */
132#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0
133#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1
134#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2
135#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3
136
137/*
138 * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead:
139 * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256)
140 * and allow for a maximum of 1024 of compression expansion if
141 * enabled.
142 */
143#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
144#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 1024
145#else
146#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD 0
147#endif
148
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000149#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
150 ( defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
151 ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
152 defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \
Hanno Becker34f88af2018-07-17 10:19:47 +0100153 defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \
154 defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) )
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000155#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC
156#endif
157
158#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200159/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */
160#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
161#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */
162#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
163#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */
164#else
165#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */
166#endif
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000167#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200168/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */
169#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16
170#endif
171
172#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
173#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256
174#else
175#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0
176#endif
177
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100178#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Beckerb1aa1b32019-05-08 17:37:58 +0100179#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100180#else
181#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0
182#endif
183
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000184#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESSION_ADD + \
185 MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \
186 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100187 MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \
188 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000189 )
190
191#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
192 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) )
193
194#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
195 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) )
196
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100197/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */
Hanno Beckerd488b9e2018-08-16 16:35:37 +0100198#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100199
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000200/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for
201 RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes
202 (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.)
203 */
204#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \
205 (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \
206 ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \
207 : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \
208 )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200209
210/*
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100211 * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
212 */
213
214#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000215#error "Bad configuration - record content too large."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100216#endif
217
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000218#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
219#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100220#endif
221
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000222#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
223#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN."
224#endif
225
226#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
227#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large."
228#endif
229
230#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
231#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large."
232#endif
233
234/* Calculate buffer sizes */
235
Hanno Becker25d6d1a2017-12-07 08:22:51 +0000236/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
237 long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
238 implicit sequence number. */
Hanno Beckerd25d4442017-10-04 13:56:42 +0100239#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100240
Andrzej Kurek033c42a2020-03-03 05:57:59 -0500241#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000242#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
243 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100244#else
245#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
246 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
247 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) )
248#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000249
Andrzej Kurek033c42a2020-03-03 05:57:59 -0500250#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000251#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
252 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100253#else
254#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
255 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
256 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) )
257#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000258
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500259#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
260static inline uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
261{
262#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Andrzej Kurek90c6e842020-04-03 05:25:29 -0400263 return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500264 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
265 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX;
266#else
Andrzej Kurek90c6e842020-04-03 05:25:29 -0400267 return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500268 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
269#endif
270}
271
272static inline uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
273{
274#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Andrzej Kurek90c6e842020-04-03 05:25:29 -0400275 return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500276 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
277 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX;
278#else
Andrzej Kurek90c6e842020-04-03 05:25:29 -0400279 return (uint32_t) mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500280 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
281#endif
282}
283#endif
284
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000285#ifdef MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT
286/* Compression buffer holds both IN and OUT buffers, so should be size of the larger */
287#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_BUFFER_LEN ( \
288 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN ) \
289 ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
290 : MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
291 )
292#endif
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100293
294/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200295 * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
296 * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
297 * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
298 */
299#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardbf57be62015-09-16 15:04:01 +0200300#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200301
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100302/**
303 * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
304 * greater or equal than a needed space.
305 *
306 * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
307 * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
308 * \param need Needed space in bytes.
309 *
310 * \return Non-zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, 0
311 * otherwise.
312 */
313static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur,
314 const uint8_t *end, size_t need )
315{
316 return( cur <= end && need <= (size_t)( end - cur ) );
317}
318
319/**
320 * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
321 * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case,
322 * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error.
323 *
324 * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
325 * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
326 * \param need Needed space in bytes.
327 *
328 */
329#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \
330 do { \
331 if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) == 0 ) \
332 { \
333 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \
334 } \
335 } while( 0 )
336
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200337#ifdef __cplusplus
338extern "C" {
339#endif
340
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100341#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100342 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100343/*
344 * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs.
345 */
346struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t
347{
348 /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable
349 * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's
350 * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function -
351 * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures
352 * to hash algorithms. */
353 mbedtls_md_type_t rsa;
354 mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa;
355};
356#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100357 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100358
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300359typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
360 const char *label,
361 const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
362 unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200363/*
364 * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake.
365 */
366struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
367{
368 /*
369 * Handshake specific crypto variables
370 */
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100371
372#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100373 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100374 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */
375#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200376#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
377 mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */
378#endif
379#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
380 mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000381
382#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Gilles Peskine42459802019-12-19 13:31:53 +0100383 psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type;
384 uint16_t ecdh_bits;
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000385 psa_key_handle_t ecdh_psa_privkey;
386 unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
387 size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len;
388#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
389#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
390
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200391#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +0200392 mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard77c06462015-09-17 13:59:49 +0200393#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
394 unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */
395 size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */
396#endif
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100397#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf4721792015-09-15 10:53:51 +0200398#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200399 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200400 const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */
401#endif
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100402#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100403#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Andrzej Kurek2349c4d2019-01-08 09:36:01 -0500404 psa_key_handle_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100405#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200406 unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */
407 size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100408#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200409#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
410 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
411#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcdc26ae2015-06-19 12:16:31 +0200412 int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200413 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */
414 mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */
415 mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100416#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200417#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100418#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd27d1a52017-08-15 11:49:08 +0200419 int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard6b7301c2017-08-15 12:08:45 +0200420 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200421 enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */
422 ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */
423 ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardc37423f2018-10-16 10:28:17 +0200424 ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */
425 ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200426 ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
427 } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
Hanno Becker3fd3f5e2019-02-25 10:08:06 +0000428 mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200429 size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200430#endif
Hanno Becker75173122019-02-06 16:18:31 +0000431#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
432 !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
433 mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */
434#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200435#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
436 unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
437 unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
438
439 unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie
440 Srv: unused */
441 unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
442 Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
443
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200444 uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */
445 unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard28f4bea2017-09-13 14:00:05 +0200446 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
447 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
448 unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200449 unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the
450 flight being received */
451 mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for
452 resending messages */
453 unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter
454 for resending messages */
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100455
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100456#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100457 /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */
458
459 uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension
Hanno Beckerf1a28082019-05-15 10:17:48 +0100460 * has been negotiated. Possible values are
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100461 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and
462 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
463 unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */
464 uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of
465 * \c peer_cid. */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100466#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100467
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100468 struct
469 {
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100470 size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated
471 * buffers used for message buffering. */
472
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100473 uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100474 * been seen in the current flight. */
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100475
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100476 struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer
477 {
Hanno Becker98081a02018-08-22 13:32:50 +0100478 unsigned is_valid : 1;
479 unsigned is_fragmented : 1;
480 unsigned is_complete : 1;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100481 unsigned char *data;
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100482 size_t data_len;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100483 } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS];
484
Hanno Becker5f066e72018-08-16 14:56:31 +0100485 struct
486 {
487 unsigned char *data;
488 size_t len;
489 unsigned epoch;
490 } future_record;
491
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100492 } buffering;
Hanno Becker35462012018-08-22 10:25:40 +0100493
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf47a4af2018-08-22 10:38:52 +0200494 uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100495#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200496
497 /*
498 * Checksum contexts
499 */
500#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
501 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
502 mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5;
503 mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1;
504#endif
505#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
506#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500507#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
508 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa;
509#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200510 mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256;
511#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500512#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200513#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500514#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Andrzej Kurek972fba52019-01-30 03:29:12 -0500515 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa;
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500516#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200517 mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512;
518#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500519#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200520#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
521
522 void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardde718b92019-05-03 11:43:28 +0200523 void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200524 void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300525 mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200526
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000527 mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
528
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200529 size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */
530
531 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */
532 unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE];
533 /*!< premaster secret */
534
535 int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/
536 int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/
537 int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/
538 int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/
539
540#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
541 int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */
542#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
543#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
544 int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */
545#endif
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200546
547#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
Gilles Peskine78300732018-04-26 13:03:29 +0200548 unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200549#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
550
551#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
552 /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the
553 * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start,
554 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start,
555 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel).
556 * The library does not use it internally. */
557 void *user_async_ctx;
558#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200559};
560
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100561typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer;
562
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200563/*
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000564 * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records
565 *
566 * There are the following general types of record transformations:
567 * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only)
568 * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher
569 * to the authenticated message.
570 * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only)
571 * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and
572 * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the
573 * handling in SSL3 & TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For SSL3
574 * and TLS 1.0, the final IV after processing a record is used
575 * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained
576 * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted
577 * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no
578 * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted
579 * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted.
580 * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only)
581 * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one
582 * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second
583 * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3.
584 * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained
585 * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte
586 * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number
587 * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation
588 * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction
589 * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the
590 * latter to the encrypted record.
591 *
592 * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant:
593 * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used.
594 * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher.
595 * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used.
596 * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest.
Hanno Becker0db7e0c2018-10-18 15:39:53 +0100597 * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit,
598 * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records.
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000599 * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0)
600 * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC)
601 * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation-
602 * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3).
603 * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC.
604 * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version.
605 * - The length of the authentication tag.
606 *
Hanno Becker0db7e0c2018-10-18 15:39:53 +0100607 * Note: Except for CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, these parameters are
608 * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations.
609 * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each
610 * operation.
611 *
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000612 * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows:
613 * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in
614 * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the
615 * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines
616 * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if
617 * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM
618 * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD.
619 * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but
620 * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}.
621 * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts
622 * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts
623 * are unused for AEAD transformations.
624 * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions > SSL3, the
625 * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within
626 * md_ctx_{enc/dec}.
627 * - For stream/CBC transformations and version SSL3, the MAC
628 * keys are stored explicitly in mac_enc, mac_dec and have
629 * a fixed size of 20 bytes. These fields are unused for
630 * AEAD transformations or transformations >= TLS 1.0.
631 * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within
632 * the transformation context, its contents are stored within
633 * iv_{enc/dec}.
634 * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV.
635 * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations
636 * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the
637 * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be
638 * different from the underlying cipher's block length
639 * in this case.
640 * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only
641 * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is
642 * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in
643 * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays.
644 * Note: For CBC in SSL3 and TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec}
645 * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations,
646 * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are
647 * not being used!
648 * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version
649 * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the
650 * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0.
651 * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the
652 * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0.
653 * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the
654 * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused
655 * in other transformations.
656 *
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200657 */
658struct mbedtls_ssl_transform
659{
660 /*
661 * Session specific crypto layer
662 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200663 size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */
664 size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */
665 size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000666 size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */
667 size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200668
669 unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */
670 unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */
671
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000672#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
673
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200674#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
675 /* Needed only for SSL v3.0 secret */
676 unsigned char mac_enc[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (enc) */
677 unsigned char mac_dec[20]; /*!< SSL v3.0 secret (dec) */
678#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
679
680 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */
681 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */
682
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000683#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
684 int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */
685#endif
686
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000687#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
688
689 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */
690 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000691 int minor_ver;
692
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100693#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100694 uint8_t in_cid_len;
695 uint8_t out_cid_len;
696 unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
697 unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100698#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100699
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200700 /*
701 * Session specific compression layer
702 */
703#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
704 z_stream ctx_deflate; /*!< compression context */
705 z_stream ctx_inflate; /*!< decompression context */
706#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard96fb0ee2019-07-09 12:54:17 +0200707
708#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
709 /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the
710 * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */
711 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
712#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200713};
714
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000715/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard1aaf6692019-07-10 14:14:05 +0200716 * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise.
717 * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise.
718 */
719static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(
720 const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
721{
722#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
723 return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 );
724#else
725 (void) transform;
726 return( 1 );
727#endif
728}
729
730/*
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000731 * Internal representation of record frames
732 *
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000733 * Instances come in two flavors:
734 * (1) Encrypted
735 * These always have data_offset = 0
736 * (2) Unencrypted
Hanno Beckercd430bc2019-04-04 16:29:48 +0100737 * These have data_offset set to the amount of
738 * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely,
739 * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV
740 * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used
741 * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers).
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000742 *
743 * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case
744 * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to
745 * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the
746 * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to
747 * make space for the fixed IV.
748 *
749 */
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100750#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100751#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100752#else
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100753#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100754#endif
755
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000756typedef struct
757{
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100758 uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number.
759 * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
760 * the 6-byte sequence number.
761 * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
762 * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
763 * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
764 * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
765 * MAC computations. */
766 uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */
767 uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire.
768 * Convert to internal presentation of versions
769 * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and
770 * mbedtls_ssl_write_version().
771 * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000772
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100773 unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */
774 size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */
775 size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */
776 size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000777
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100778#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100779 uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */
780 unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100781#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000782} mbedtls_record;
783
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200784#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
785/*
786 * List of certificate + private key pairs
787 */
788struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert
789{
790 mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */
791 mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */
792 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */
793};
794#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
795
796#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
797/*
798 * List of handshake messages kept around for resending
799 */
800struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item
801{
802 unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */
803 size_t len; /*!< length of p */
804 unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */
805 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */
806};
807#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
808
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100809#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100810 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100811
812/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */
813mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
814 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg );
815/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */
816void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
817 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg,
818 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
819/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */
820void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
821 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
822
823/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */
824static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set )
825{
826 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
827}
828
829#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) &&
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100830 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200831
832/**
833 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear
834 * memory
835 *
836 * \param transform SSL transform context
837 */
838void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
839
840/**
841 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear
842 * memory
843 *
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200844 * \param ssl SSL context
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200845 */
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200846void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200847
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200848int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
849int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
850void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
851
852int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
853
854void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
855int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
856
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +0100857int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
858int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
859void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
860
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100861/**
862 * \brief Update record layer
863 *
864 * This function roughly separates the implementation
865 * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation
866 * of the secure transport.
867 *
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100868 * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
869 * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest
870 * should be automatically updated in case
871 * a handshake message is found.
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100872 *
873 * \return 0 or non-zero error code.
874 *
875 * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here
876 * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible:
877 *
878 * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying
879 * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into
880 * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which
881 * conceptually provides the following:
882 *
883 * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports
884 * for handshake, alert and CCS messages.
885 * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport
886 * for application data.
887 * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform
888 * securing the contents.
889 *
890 * The interface to this functionality is given as follows:
891 *
892 * a Updating
893 * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record]
894 *
895 * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending:
896 * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application
897 * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers
898 * provide access to the data for the user to process it.
899 * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically
900 * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers
901 * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application
902 * data (2) is user-controlled.
903 *
904 * b Reading of application data
905 * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer]
906 *
907 * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data
908 * is different from the automatic consumption of control
909 * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream.
910 *
911 * c Tracking availability of application data
912 * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen]
913 *
914 * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for
915 * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer
916 * provides functionality for checking how much application
917 * data is still available in the internal buffer.
918 *
919 * d Changing the transformation securing the communication.
920 *
921 * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the
922 * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic
923 * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything
924 * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g.
925 * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the
926 * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read.
927 *
928 * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the
929 * record layer, but the current implementation deviates
930 * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of
931 * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record
932 * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which
933 * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility
934 * following the above definition.
935 *
936 */
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100937int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
938 unsigned update_hs_digest );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200939int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want );
940
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard31c15862017-09-13 09:38:11 +0200941int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker67bc7c32018-08-06 11:33:50 +0100942int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200943int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
944
945int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
946int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
947
948int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
949int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
950
951int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
952int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
953
954void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
955 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info );
956
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100957#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200958int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex );
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000959
Guilhem Bryant8a69ddd2020-03-27 11:13:39 +0000960/**
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000961 * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence:
962 * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
963 * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()
964 * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function
965 */
966static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
967 const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len )
968{
969 if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 )
970 {
971 *psk = ssl->handshake->psk;
972 *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len;
973 }
974
975 else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 )
976 {
977 *psk = ssl->conf->psk;
978 *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len;
979 }
980
981 else
982 {
Guilhem Bryantb5f04e42020-04-01 11:23:58 +0100983 *psk = NULL;
984 *psk_len = 0;
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000985 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
986 }
987
988 return( 0 );
989}
990
991#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Guilhem Bryant8a69ddd2020-03-27 11:13:39 +0000992/**
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000993 * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence:
994 * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK
995 * callback
996 * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
997 * Return an opaque PSK
998 */
999static inline psa_key_handle_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(
1000 const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1001{
1002 if( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque != 0 )
1003 return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque );
1004
1005 if( ssl->conf->psk_opaque != 0 )
1006 return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque );
1007
1008 return( 0 );
1009}
1010#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
1011
1012#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001013
1014#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
1015unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk );
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +01001016unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001017mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig );
1018#endif
1019
1020mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +02001021unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md );
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +01001022int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001023
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardb541da62015-06-17 11:43:30 +02001024#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9d412d82015-06-17 12:10:46 +02001025int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001026#endif
1027
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +01001028#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +02001029int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1030 mbedtls_md_type_t md );
1031#endif
1032
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001033#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
1034static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1035{
1036 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
1037
1038 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
1039 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
1040 else
1041 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
1042
1043 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key );
1044}
1045
1046static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1047{
1048 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
1049
1050 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
1051 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
1052 else
1053 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
1054
1055 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert );
1056}
1057
1058/*
1059 * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions:
1060 * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later).
1061 *
1062 * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we
1063 * check a cert we received from them)!
1064 *
1065 * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
1066 */
1067int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
1068 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
1069 int cert_endpoint,
1070 uint32_t *flags );
1071#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
1072
1073void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
1074 unsigned char ver[2] );
1075void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
1076 const unsigned char ver[2] );
1077
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +01001078static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001079{
Hanno Becker47be7682019-07-12 09:55:46 +01001080#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1081 ((void) ssl);
1082#endif
1083
1084#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1085 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1086 {
1087 return( 13 );
1088 }
1089 else
1090#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
1091 {
1092 return( 5 );
1093 }
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +01001094}
1095
1096static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1097{
Hanno Becker3b154c12019-05-03 15:05:27 +01001098 return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001099}
1100
1101static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1102{
1103#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1104 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1105 return( 12 );
1106#else
1107 ((void) ssl);
1108#endif
1109 return( 4 );
1110}
1111
1112#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1113void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1114void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1115int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard87a346f2017-09-13 12:45:21 +02001116int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001117#endif
1118
1119/* Visible for testing purposes only */
1120#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
Hanno Becker0183d692019-07-12 08:50:37 +01001121int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001122void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1123#endif
1124
Hanno Becker52055ae2019-02-06 14:30:46 +00001125int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
1126 const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
1127
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001128/* constant-time buffer comparison */
1129static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
1130{
1131 size_t i;
Hanno Becker59e69632017-06-26 13:26:58 +01001132 volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
1133 volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
1134 volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001135
1136 for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
Azim Khan45b79cf2018-05-23 16:55:16 +01001137 {
1138 /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
1139 * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
1140 * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
1141 unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
1142 diff |= x ^ y;
1143 }
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001144
1145 return( diff );
1146}
1147
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001148#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
1149 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
1150int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1151 unsigned char *output,
1152 unsigned char *data, size_t data_len );
1153#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
1154 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
1155
1156#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
1157 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
Andrzej Kurek814feff2019-01-14 04:35:19 -05001158/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001159int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
Gilles Peskineca1d7422018-04-24 11:53:22 +02001160 unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
1161 unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
1162 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001163#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
1164 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
1165
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001166#ifdef __cplusplus
1167}
1168#endif
1169
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001170void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1171int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1172 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1173 mbedtls_record *rec,
1174 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1175 void *p_rng );
Hanno Becker605949f2019-07-12 08:23:59 +01001176int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001177 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1178 mbedtls_record *rec );
1179
Hanno Beckerdd772292020-02-05 10:38:31 +00001180/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
1181static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1182{
1183#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1184 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1185 return( 2 );
1186#else
1187 ((void) ssl);
1188#endif
1189 return( 0 );
1190}
1191
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001192#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Hanno Becker786300f2020-02-05 10:46:40 +00001193int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001194#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
Hanno Becker0f57a652020-02-05 10:37:26 +00001195
1196void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs );
Hanno Becker7876d122020-02-05 10:39:31 +00001197int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1198
Hanno Becker3e6f8ab2020-02-05 10:40:57 +00001199void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1200void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1201 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1202void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1203
Hanno Becker43aefe22020-02-05 10:44:56 +00001204int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
1205
Hanno Becker7e8e6a62020-02-05 10:45:48 +00001206#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
1207void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1208#endif
1209
Hanno Beckerce5f5fd2020-02-05 10:47:44 +00001210void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1211
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001212#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
Hanno Becker40cdaa12020-02-05 10:48:27 +00001213int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001214#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
Hanno Becker89490712020-02-05 10:50:12 +00001215
Hanno Becker533ab5f2020-02-05 10:49:13 +00001216#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001217size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker533ab5f2020-02-05 10:49:13 +00001218void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1219void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight );
1220#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
1221
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001222#endif /* ssl_internal.h */