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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001/**
Darryl Greena40a1012018-01-05 15:33:17 +00002 * \file ssl_internal.h
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02003 *
4 * \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules
Darryl Greena40a1012018-01-05 15:33:17 +00005 */
6/*
Bence Szépkúti1e148272020-08-07 13:07:28 +02007 * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard37ff1402015-09-04 14:21:07 +02008 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
9 *
10 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
11 * not use this file except in compliance with the License.
12 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
13 *
14 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
15 *
16 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
17 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
18 * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
19 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
20 * limitations under the License.
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020021 */
22#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
23#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INTERNAL_H
24
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050025#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010026#include "mbedtls/config.h"
Andrzej Kurekc470b6b2019-01-31 08:20:20 -050027#else
28#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
29#endif
30
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010031#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
32#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +020033
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -050034#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
35#include "psa/crypto.h"
36#endif
37
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020038#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010039#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020040#endif
41
42#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010043#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020044#endif
45
46#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010047#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020048#endif
49
50#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010051#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard56273da2015-05-26 12:19:45 +020052#endif
53
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +020054#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010055#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +020056#endif
57
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000058#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
59#include "psa/crypto.h"
Jaeden Amero6609aef2019-07-04 20:01:14 +010060#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +000061#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
62
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0223ab92015-10-05 11:40:01 +010063#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
64 !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020065#define inline __inline
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard20af64d2015-07-07 18:33:39 +020066#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020067
68/* Determine minimum supported version */
69#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
70
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020071#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
72#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
73#else
74#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
75#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2
76#else
77#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
78#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
79#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
80#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
81#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020082
Ron Eldor5e9f14d2017-05-28 10:46:38 +030083#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
84#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_VALID_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
85
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020086/* Determine maximum supported version */
87#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MAJOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3
88
89#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
90#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
91#else
92#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
93#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2
94#else
95#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1)
96#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_MINOR_VERSION MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1
97#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +020098#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 */
99#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
100#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
101
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard862cde52017-05-17 11:56:15 +0200102/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200103#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
104 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
105 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
106 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100107#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200108#endif
109
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200110#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0
111#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */
112#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */
113#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */
114
115/*
116 * DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4
117 *
118 * The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends,
119 * but is distinct for resends.
120 *
121 * Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway.
122 */
123#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0
124#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1
125#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2
126#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3
127
128/*
129 * Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead:
Mateusz Starzyka3a99842021-02-19 14:27:22 +0100130 * counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256).
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200131 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200132
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard05579c42020-07-31 12:53:39 +0200133/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2df1f1f2020-07-09 12:11:39 +0200134#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
135 ( defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
136 defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) || \
137 defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || \
138 defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) )
139#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC
140#endif
141
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100142/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.0-1.2 is supported. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarded0e8642020-07-21 11:20:30 +0200143#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
144 ( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
145 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
146 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) )
147#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC
148#endif
149
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000150#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2df1f1f2020-07-09 12:11:39 +0200151 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000152#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC
153#endif
154
155#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200156/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */
157#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
158#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */
159#elif defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
160#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */
161#else
162#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */
163#endif
Hanno Becker52344c22018-01-03 15:24:20 +0000164#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200165/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */
166#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16
167#endif
168
169#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
170#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256
171#else
172#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0
173#endif
174
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100175#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Beckerb1aa1b32019-05-08 17:37:58 +0100176#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100177#else
178#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0
179#endif
180
Mateusz Starzyka3a99842021-02-19 14:27:22 +0100181#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD ( MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000182 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100183 MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \
184 MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000185 )
186
187#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
188 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) )
189
190#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
191 ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) )
192
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100193/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */
Hanno Beckerd488b9e2018-08-16 16:35:37 +0100194#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100195
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000196/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for
197 RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes
198 (the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.)
199 */
200#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \
201 (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \
202 ? ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) \
203 : ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN ) \
204 )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200205
Hanno Beckere131bfe2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100206/* Maximum size in bytes of list in sig-hash algorithm ext., RFC 5246 */
207#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534
208
209/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */
210#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535
211
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200212/*
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100213 * Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
214 */
215
216#if MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000217#error "Bad configuration - record content too large."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100218#endif
219
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000220#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
221#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN."
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100222#endif
223
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000224#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
225#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content should not be larger than MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN."
226#endif
227
228#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
229#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large."
230#endif
231
232#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
233#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large."
234#endif
235
236/* Calculate buffer sizes */
237
Hanno Becker25d6d1a2017-12-07 08:22:51 +0000238/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
239 long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
240 implicit sequence number. */
Hanno Beckerd25d4442017-10-04 13:56:42 +0100241#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100242
Andrzej Kurek033c42a2020-03-03 05:57:59 -0500243#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000244#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
245 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100246#else
247#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
248 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
249 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX ) )
250#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000251
Andrzej Kurek033c42a2020-03-03 05:57:59 -0500252#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000253#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
254 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) )
Hanno Becker6cbad552019-05-08 15:40:11 +0100255#else
256#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
257 ( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN ) + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ) \
258 + ( MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ) )
259#endif
Angus Grattond8213d02016-05-25 20:56:48 +1000260
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500261#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500262static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500263{
264#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500265 return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500266 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
267 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX;
268#else
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500269 return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500270 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
271#endif
272}
273
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500274static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500275{
276#if defined (MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500277 return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500278 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
279 + MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX;
280#else
Andrzej Kurek069fa962021-01-07 08:02:15 -0500281 return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len( ctx )
Andrzej Kurek0afa2a12020-03-03 10:39:58 -0500282 + MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
283#endif
284}
285#endif
286
Hanno Beckera8434e82017-09-18 10:54:39 +0100287/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200288 * TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
289 * that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
290 * of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
291 */
292#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardbf57be62015-09-16 15:04:01 +0200293#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard065122c2015-05-26 12:31:46 +0200294
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100295/**
296 * \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
297 * greater or equal than a needed space.
298 *
299 * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
300 * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
301 * \param need Needed space in bytes.
302 *
Ronald Cronb7b35e12020-06-11 09:50:51 +0200303 * \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100304 * otherwise.
305 */
306static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( const uint8_t *cur,
307 const uint8_t *end, size_t need )
308{
Ronald Cronb7b35e12020-06-11 09:50:51 +0200309 return( ( cur > end ) || ( need > (size_t)( end - cur ) ) );
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100310}
311
312/**
313 * \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
314 * greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case,
315 * it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error.
316 *
317 * \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
318 * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
319 * \param need Needed space in bytes.
320 *
321 */
322#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cur, end, need ) \
323 do { \
Ronald Cronb7b35e12020-06-11 09:50:51 +0200324 if( mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr( ( cur ), ( end ), ( need ) ) != 0 ) \
Hanno Becker51018aa2017-04-12 14:54:42 +0100325 { \
326 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ); \
327 } \
328 } while( 0 )
329
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200330#ifdef __cplusplus
331extern "C" {
332#endif
333
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100334#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100335 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100336/*
337 * Abstraction for a grid of allowed signature-hash-algorithm pairs.
338 */
339struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t
340{
341 /* At the moment, we only need to remember a single suitable
342 * hash algorithm per signature algorithm. As long as that's
343 * the case - and we don't need a general lookup function -
344 * we can implement the sig-hash-set as a map from signatures
345 * to hash algorithms. */
346 mbedtls_md_type_t rsa;
347 mbedtls_md_type_t ecdsa;
348};
349#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100350 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100351
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300352typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb( const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
353 const char *label,
354 const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
355 unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen );
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100356
Hanno Becker61baae72020-09-16 09:24:14 +0100357/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100358 * all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those
359 * ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled
360 * in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is
361 * not used for record protection in SSL/TLS.
362 *
363 * In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures,
364 * we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV}
365 * macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into
366 * account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS.
367 *
368 * Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH
369 * in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here
Hanno Becker9a7a2ac2020-09-09 09:24:54 +0100370 * we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100371 * for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the
372 * computation of the maximum key length. */
373#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16
374#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16
375#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32
376
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100377/**
378 * \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV)
379 * used for record protection in TLS 1.3.
380 */
381struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set
382{
383 /*! The key for client->server records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100384 unsigned char client_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100385 /*! The key for server->client records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100386 unsigned char server_write_key[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100387 /*! The IV for client->server records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100388 unsigned char client_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100389 /*! The IV for server->client records. */
Hanno Becker15889832020-09-08 11:29:11 +0100390 unsigned char server_write_iv[ MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH ];
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100391
Hanno Becker493ea7f2020-09-08 11:01:00 +0100392 size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and
393 * server_write_key, in Bytes. */
394 size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and
395 * server_write_iv, in Bytes. */
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100396};
397typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set;
Hanno Becker3385a4d2020-08-21 13:03:34 +0100398
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200399/*
400 * This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake.
401 */
402struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
403{
404 /*
405 * Handshake specific crypto variables
406 */
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100407
408#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100409 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100410 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t hash_algs; /*!< Set of suitable sig-hash pairs */
411#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200412#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
413 mbedtls_dhm_context dhm_ctx; /*!< DHM key exchange */
414#endif
John Durkop07cc04a2020-11-16 22:08:34 -0800415/* Adding guard for MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C to ensure no compile errors due
416 * to guards also being in ssl_srv.c and ssl_cli.c. There is a gap
417 * in functionality that access to ecdh_ctx structure is needed for
418 * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C which does not seem correct.
419 */
420#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200421 mbedtls_ecdh_context ecdh_ctx; /*!< ECDH key exchange */
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000422
423#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Gilles Peskine42459802019-12-19 13:31:53 +0100424 psa_key_type_t ecdh_psa_type;
425 uint16_t ecdh_bits;
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +0200426 psa_key_id_t ecdh_psa_privkey;
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000427 unsigned char ecdh_psa_peerkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
428 size_t ecdh_psa_peerkey_len;
429#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
John Durkop07cc04a2020-11-16 22:08:34 -0800430#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
Hanno Beckerdf51dbe2019-02-18 16:41:55 +0000431
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200432#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard76cfd3f2015-09-15 12:10:54 +0200433 mbedtls_ecjpake_context ecjpake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard77c06462015-09-17 13:59:49 +0200434#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
435 unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */
436 size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */
437#endif
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100438#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf4721792015-09-15 10:53:51 +0200439#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardeef142d2015-09-16 10:05:04 +0200440 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200441 const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves; /*!< Supported elliptic curves */
442#endif
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100443#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100444#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +0200445 psa_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
Hanno Beckerd9f7d432018-10-22 15:29:46 +0100446#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200447 unsigned char *psk; /*!< PSK from the callback */
448 size_t psk_len; /*!< Length of PSK from callback */
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100449#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200450#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
451 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
452#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcdc26ae2015-06-19 12:16:31 +0200453 int sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200454 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */
455 mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */
456 mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100457#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200458#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100459#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardd27d1a52017-08-15 11:49:08 +0200460 int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard6b7301c2017-08-15 12:08:45 +0200461 mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200462 enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */
463 ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */
464 ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardc37423f2018-10-16 10:28:17 +0200465 ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */
466 ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200467 ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
468 } ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
Hanno Becker3fd3f5e2019-02-25 10:08:06 +0000469 mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard0b23f162017-08-24 12:08:33 +0200470 size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard2350b4e2017-05-16 09:26:48 +0200471#endif
Hanno Becker75173122019-02-06 16:18:31 +0000472#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
473 !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
474 mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */
475#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200476#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
477 unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
478 unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
479
480 unsigned char *verify_cookie; /*!< Cli: HelloVerifyRequest cookie
481 Srv: unused */
482 unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
483 Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
484
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200485 uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */
486 unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard28f4bea2017-09-13 14:00:05 +0200487 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
488 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
489 unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200490 unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the
491 flight being received */
492 mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for
493 resending messages */
494 unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter
495 for resending messages */
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100496
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100497#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100498 /* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */
499
500 uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension
Hanno Beckerf1a28082019-05-15 10:17:48 +0100501 * has been negotiated. Possible values are
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100502 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and
503 * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
504 unsigned char peer_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ]; /*! The peer's CID */
505 uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of
506 * \c peer_cid. */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100507#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker2f28c102019-04-25 15:46:59 +0100508
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100509 struct
510 {
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100511 size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated
512 * buffers used for message buffering. */
513
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100514 uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has
Hanno Becker2ed6bcc2018-08-15 15:11:57 +0100515 * been seen in the current flight. */
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100516
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100517 struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer
518 {
Hanno Becker98081a02018-08-22 13:32:50 +0100519 unsigned is_valid : 1;
520 unsigned is_fragmented : 1;
521 unsigned is_complete : 1;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100522 unsigned char *data;
Hanno Beckere0b150f2018-08-21 15:51:03 +0100523 size_t data_len;
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100524 } hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS];
525
Hanno Becker5f066e72018-08-16 14:56:31 +0100526 struct
527 {
528 unsigned char *data;
529 size_t len;
530 unsigned epoch;
531 } future_record;
532
Hanno Beckerd7f8ae22018-08-16 09:45:56 +0100533 } buffering;
Hanno Becker35462012018-08-22 10:25:40 +0100534
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardf47a4af2018-08-22 10:38:52 +0200535 uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
Hanno Becker1aa267c2017-04-28 17:08:27 +0100536#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200537
538 /*
539 * Checksum contexts
540 */
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100541#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200542 mbedtls_md5_context fin_md5;
543 mbedtls_sha1_context fin_sha1;
544#endif
545#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
546#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500547#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
548 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa;
549#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200550 mbedtls_sha256_context fin_sha256;
551#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500552#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200553#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500554#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Andrzej Kurek972fba52019-01-30 03:29:12 -0500555 psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa;
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500556#else
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200557 mbedtls_sha512_context fin_sha512;
558#endif
Andrzej Kurekeb342242019-01-29 09:14:33 -0500559#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200560#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
561
562 void (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardde718b92019-05-03 11:43:28 +0200563 void (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200564 void (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
Ron Eldor51d3ab52019-05-12 14:54:30 +0300565 mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200566
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000567 mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
568
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200569 size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */
570
571 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< random bytes */
572 unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE];
573 /*!< premaster secret */
574
575 int resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/
576 int max_major_ver; /*!< max. major version client*/
577 int max_minor_ver; /*!< max. minor version client*/
578 int cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/
579
580#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
581 int new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */
582#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
583#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
584 int extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */
585#endif
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200586
587#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
Gilles Peskine78300732018-04-26 13:03:29 +0200588 unsigned int async_in_progress : 1; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */
Gilles Peskinedf13d5c2018-04-25 20:39:48 +0200589#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
590
591#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
592 /** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the
593 * asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start,
594 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_decrypt_start,
595 * mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel).
596 * The library does not use it internally. */
597 void *user_async_ctx;
598#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200599};
600
Hanno Becker0271f962018-08-16 13:23:47 +0100601typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer;
602
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200603/*
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000604 * Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records
605 *
606 * There are the following general types of record transformations:
607 * - Stream transformations (TLS versions <= 1.2 only)
608 * Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher
609 * to the authenticated message.
610 * - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions <= 1.2 only)
611 * In addition to the distinction of the order of encryption and
612 * authentication, there's a fundamental difference between the
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100613 * handling in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2: For TLS 1.0,
614 * the final IV after processing a record is used
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000615 * as the IV for the next record. No explicit IV is contained
616 * in an encrypted record. The IV for the first record is extracted
617 * at key extraction time. In contrast, for TLS 1.1 and 1.2, no
618 * IV is generated at key extraction time, but every encrypted
619 * record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was encrypted.
620 * - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions >= 1.2 only)
621 * These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one
622 * used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second
623 * one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3.
624 * In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained
625 * as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte
626 * record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number
627 * to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation
628 * the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction
629 * time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the
630 * latter to the encrypted record.
631 *
Hanno Becker7d343ec2020-05-04 12:29:05 +0100632 * Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext
633 * which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true
634 * content type.
635 *
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000636 * In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant:
637 * - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used.
638 * - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher.
639 * - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used.
640 * - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest.
Hanno Becker0db7e0c2018-10-18 15:39:53 +0100641 * - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit,
642 * random initialization vector placed in encrypted records.
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100643 * - For some transformations (currently AEAD and CBC in TLS 1.0)
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000644 * an implicit IV. It may be static (e.g. AEAD) or dynamic (e.g. CBC)
645 * and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation-
646 * dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3).
647 * - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC.
648 * - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version.
649 * - The length of the authentication tag.
650 *
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100651 * Note: Except for CBC in TLS 1.0, these parameters are
Hanno Becker0db7e0c2018-10-18 15:39:53 +0100652 * constant across multiple encryption/decryption operations.
653 * For CBC, the implicit IV needs to be updated after each
654 * operation.
655 *
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000656 * The struct below refines this abstract view as follows:
657 * - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in
658 * cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the
659 * same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines
660 * the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if
661 * the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM
662 * then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD.
663 * - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but
664 * are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}.
665 * - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts
666 * used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts
667 * are unused for AEAD transformations.
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100668 * - For stream/CBC transformations and versions >= TLS 1.0, the
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000669 * MAC keys are not stored explicitly but maintained within
670 * md_ctx_{enc/dec}.
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100671 * - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations or
672 * transformations >= TLS 1.0.
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000673 * - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within
674 * the transformation context, its contents are stored within
675 * iv_{enc/dec}.
676 * - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV.
677 * This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations
678 * which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the
679 * IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be
680 * different from the underlying cipher's block length
681 * in this case.
682 * - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only
683 * and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is
684 * constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in
685 * the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays.
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +0100686 * Note: For CBC in TLS 1.0, the fields iv_{enc/dec}
Hanno Beckerd362dc52018-01-03 15:23:11 +0000687 * still store IV's for continued use across multiple transformations,
688 * so it is not true that fixed_ivlen == 0 means that iv_{enc/dec} are
689 * not being used!
690 * - minor_ver denotes the SSL/TLS version
691 * - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the
692 * authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0.
693 * - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the
694 * authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0.
695 * - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the
696 * order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused
697 * in other transformations.
698 *
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200699 */
700struct mbedtls_ssl_transform
701{
702 /*
703 * Session specific crypto layer
704 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200705 size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */
706 size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */
707 size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */
Hanno Beckere694c3e2017-12-27 21:34:08 +0000708 size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */
709 size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200710
711 unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */
712 unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */
713
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000714#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
715
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200716 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */
717 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */
718
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000719#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
720 int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */
721#endif
722
Hanno Beckerd56ed242018-01-03 15:32:51 +0000723#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
724
725 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_enc; /*!< encryption context */
726 mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx_dec; /*!< decryption context */
Hanno Becker9eddaeb2017-12-27 21:37:21 +0000727 int minor_ver;
728
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100729#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100730 uint8_t in_cid_len;
731 uint8_t out_cid_len;
732 unsigned char in_cid [ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
733 unsigned char out_cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX ];
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100734#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker1327fa72019-04-25 15:54:02 +0100735
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard96fb0ee2019-07-09 12:54:17 +0200736#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
737 /* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the
738 * Master Secret and other session info, see ssl_populate_transform() */
739 unsigned char randbytes[64]; /*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
740#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200741};
742
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000743/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard1aaf6692019-07-10 14:14:05 +0200744 * Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise.
745 * Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise.
746 */
747static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(
748 const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform )
749{
750#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC)
751 return( transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0 );
752#else
753 (void) transform;
754 return( 1 );
755#endif
756}
757
758/*
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000759 * Internal representation of record frames
760 *
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000761 * Instances come in two flavors:
762 * (1) Encrypted
763 * These always have data_offset = 0
764 * (2) Unencrypted
Hanno Beckercd430bc2019-04-04 16:29:48 +0100765 * These have data_offset set to the amount of
766 * pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely,
767 * this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV
768 * used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used
769 * (e.g. for CBC in TLS 1.0, or stream ciphers).
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000770 *
771 * The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case
772 * is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to
773 * an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the
774 * encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to
775 * make space for the fixed IV.
776 *
777 */
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100778#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100779#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100780#else
Hanno Becker75f080f2019-04-30 15:01:51 +0100781#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
Hanno Beckerf2ed4482019-04-29 13:45:54 +0100782#endif
783
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000784typedef struct
785{
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100786 uint8_t ctr[8]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number.
787 * In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
788 * the 6-byte sequence number.
789 * This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
790 * as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
791 * need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
792 * need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
793 * MAC computations. */
794 uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */
795 uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire.
796 * Convert to internal presentation of versions
797 * using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and
798 * mbedtls_ssl_write_version().
799 * Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000800
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100801 unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */
802 size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */
803 size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */
804 size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000805
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100806#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
Hanno Beckerd840cea2019-07-11 09:24:36 +0100807 uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */
808 unsigned char cid[ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX ]; /* The CID */
Hanno Beckera0e20d02019-05-15 14:03:01 +0100809#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
Hanno Becker12a3a862018-01-05 15:42:50 +0000810} mbedtls_record;
811
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200812#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
813/*
814 * List of certificate + private key pairs
815 */
816struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert
817{
818 mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */
819 mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */
820 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */
821};
822#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
823
824#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
825/*
826 * List of handshake messages kept around for resending
827 */
828struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item
829{
830 unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */
831 size_t len; /*!< length of p */
832 unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */
833 mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */
834};
835#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
836
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100837#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100838 defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +0100839
840/* Find an entry in a signature-hash set matching a given hash algorithm. */
841mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_find( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
842 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg );
843/* Add a signature-hash-pair to a signature-hash set */
844void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_add( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
845 mbedtls_pk_type_t sig_alg,
846 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
847/* Allow exactly one hash algorithm for each signature. */
848void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set,
849 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
850
851/* Setup an empty signature-hash set */
852static inline void mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_init( mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t *set )
853{
854 mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_const_hash( set, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE );
855}
856
857#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) &&
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100858 MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200859
860/**
861 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear
862 * memory
863 *
864 * \param transform SSL transform context
865 */
866void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
867
868/**
869 * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear
870 * memory
871 *
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200872 * \param ssl SSL context
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200873 */
Gilles Peskine9b562d52018-04-25 20:32:43 +0200874void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcd4fcc62015-05-26 12:11:48 +0200875
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200876int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
877int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
878void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
879
880int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
881
882void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
883int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
884
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +0100885int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
886int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
887void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
888
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100889/**
890 * \brief Update record layer
891 *
892 * This function roughly separates the implementation
893 * of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation
894 * of the secure transport.
895 *
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100896 * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
897 * \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest
898 * should be automatically updated in case
899 * a handshake message is found.
Hanno Becker4a810fb2017-05-24 16:27:30 +0100900 *
901 * \return 0 or non-zero error code.
902 *
903 * \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here
904 * is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible:
905 *
906 * The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying
907 * transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into
908 * a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which
909 * conceptually provides the following:
910 *
911 * (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports
912 * for handshake, alert and CCS messages.
913 * (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport
914 * for application data.
915 * (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform
916 * securing the contents.
917 *
918 * The interface to this functionality is given as follows:
919 *
920 * a Updating
921 * [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record]
922 *
923 * Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending:
924 * Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application
925 * data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers
926 * provide access to the data for the user to process it.
927 * Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically
928 * on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers
929 * for previous datagrams, while consumption of application
930 * data (2) is user-controlled.
931 *
932 * b Reading of application data
933 * [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer]
934 *
935 * As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data
936 * is different from the automatic consumption of control
937 * datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream.
938 *
939 * c Tracking availability of application data
940 * [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen]
941 *
942 * For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for
943 * application data in case of DTLS, the record layer
944 * provides functionality for checking how much application
945 * data is still available in the internal buffer.
946 *
947 * d Changing the transformation securing the communication.
948 *
949 * Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the
950 * above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic
951 * of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything
952 * about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g.
953 * in all the handshake handling functions, and in the
954 * application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read.
955 *
956 * \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the
957 * record layer, but the current implementation deviates
958 * from it in some places. For example, our implementation of
959 * the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record
960 * discards datagrams depending on the current state, which
961 * wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility
962 * following the above definition.
963 *
964 */
Hanno Becker3a0aad12018-08-20 09:44:02 +0100965int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
966 unsigned update_hs_digest );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200967int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want );
968
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard31c15862017-09-13 09:38:11 +0200969int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker67bc7c32018-08-06 11:33:50 +0100970int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200971int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
972
973int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
974int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
975
976int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
977int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
978
979int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
980int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
981
982void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
983 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info );
984
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +0100985#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +0200986int mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t key_ex );
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000987
Guilhem Bryant8a69ddd2020-03-27 11:13:39 +0000988/**
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +0000989 * Get the first defined PSK by order of precedence:
990 * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
991 * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk()
992 * Return a code and update the pair (PSK, PSK length) passed to this function
993 */
994static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
995 const unsigned char **psk, size_t *psk_len )
996{
997 if( ssl->handshake->psk != NULL && ssl->handshake->psk_len > 0 )
998 {
999 *psk = ssl->handshake->psk;
1000 *psk_len = ssl->handshake->psk_len;
1001 }
1002
1003 else if( ssl->conf->psk != NULL && ssl->conf->psk_len > 0 )
1004 {
1005 *psk = ssl->conf->psk;
1006 *psk_len = ssl->conf->psk_len;
1007 }
1008
1009 else
1010 {
Guilhem Bryantb5f04e42020-04-01 11:23:58 +01001011 *psk = NULL;
1012 *psk_len = 0;
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001013 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
1014 }
1015
1016 return( 0 );
1017}
1018
1019#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
Guilhem Bryant8a69ddd2020-03-27 11:13:39 +00001020/**
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001021 * Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence:
1022 * 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK
1023 * callback
1024 * 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
1025 * Return an opaque PSK
1026 */
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001027static inline psa_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001028 const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1029{
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001030 if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque ) )
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001031 return( ssl->handshake->psk_opaque );
1032
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001033 if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( ssl->conf->psk_opaque ) )
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001034 return( ssl->conf->psk_opaque );
1035
Ronald Croncf56a0a2020-08-04 09:51:30 +02001036 return( MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT );
Guilhem Bryantd511ac32020-03-25 17:06:37 +00001037}
1038#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
1039
1040#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001041
1042#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
1043unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_pk_context *pk );
Hanno Becker7e5437a2017-04-28 17:15:26 +01001044unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg( mbedtls_pk_type_t type );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001045mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( unsigned char sig );
1046#endif
1047
1048mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( unsigned char hash );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +02001049unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( int md );
Simon Butcher99000142016-10-13 17:21:01 +01001050int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001051
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardb541da62015-06-17 11:43:30 +02001052#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard9d412d82015-06-17 12:10:46 +02001053int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001054#endif
1055
Gilles Peskineeccd8882020-03-10 12:19:08 +01001056#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard7bfc1222015-06-17 14:34:48 +02001057int mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1058 mbedtls_md_type_t md );
1059#endif
1060
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001061#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001062static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
1063 ( const uint16_t srtp_profile_value )
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001064{
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001065 switch( srtp_profile_value )
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001066 {
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001067 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001068 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001069 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:
Johan Pascal85269572020-08-25 10:01:54 +02001070 case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001071 return srtp_profile_value;
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001072 default: break;
1073 }
Johan Pascal43f94902020-09-22 12:25:52 +02001074 return( MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET );
Ron Eldor089c9fe2018-12-06 17:12:49 +02001075}
1076#endif
1077
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001078#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
1079static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1080{
1081 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
1082
1083 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
1084 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
1085 else
1086 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
1087
1088 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key );
1089}
1090
1091static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1092{
1093 mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
1094
1095 if( ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL )
1096 key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
1097 else
1098 key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
1099
1100 return( key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert );
1101}
1102
1103/*
1104 * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions:
1105 * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later).
1106 *
1107 * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we
1108 * check a cert we received from them)!
1109 *
1110 * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
1111 */
1112int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
1113 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
1114 int cert_endpoint,
1115 uint32_t *flags );
1116#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
1117
1118void mbedtls_ssl_write_version( int major, int minor, int transport,
1119 unsigned char ver[2] );
1120void mbedtls_ssl_read_version( int *major, int *minor, int transport,
1121 const unsigned char ver[2] );
1122
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +01001123static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001124{
Hanno Becker47be7682019-07-12 09:55:46 +01001125#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1126 ((void) ssl);
1127#endif
1128
1129#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1130 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1131 {
1132 return( 13 );
1133 }
1134 else
1135#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
1136 {
1137 return( 5 );
1138 }
Hanno Becker5903de42019-05-03 14:46:38 +01001139}
1140
1141static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1142{
Hanno Becker3b154c12019-05-03 15:05:27 +01001143 return( (size_t) ( ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001144}
1145
1146static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1147{
1148#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1149 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1150 return( 12 );
1151#else
1152 ((void) ssl);
1153#endif
1154 return( 4 );
1155}
1156
1157#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1158void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1159void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1160int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard87a346f2017-09-13 12:45:21 +02001161int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001162#endif
1163
1164/* Visible for testing purposes only */
1165#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
Hanno Becker0183d692019-07-12 08:50:37 +01001166int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001167void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1168#endif
1169
Hanno Becker52055ae2019-02-06 14:30:46 +00001170int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy( mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
1171 const mbedtls_ssl_session *src );
1172
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001173/* constant-time buffer comparison */
1174static inline int mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n )
1175{
1176 size_t i;
Hanno Becker59e69632017-06-26 13:26:58 +01001177 volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
1178 volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
1179 volatile unsigned char diff = 0;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001180
1181 for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
Azim Khan45b79cf2018-05-23 16:55:16 +01001182 {
1183 /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
1184 * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
1185 * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
1186 unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
1187 diff |= x ^ y;
1188 }
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001189
1190 return( diff );
1191}
1192
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +01001193#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001194int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1195 unsigned char *output,
1196 unsigned char *data, size_t data_len );
Mateusz Starzyk06b07fb2021-02-18 13:55:21 +01001197#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001198
1199#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
1200 defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
Andrzej Kurek814feff2019-01-14 04:35:19 -05001201/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001202int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
Gilles Peskineca1d7422018-04-24 11:53:22 +02001203 unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
1204 unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
1205 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg );
Andres Amaya Garcia46f5a3e2017-07-20 16:17:51 +01001206#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
1207 MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
1208
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001209#ifdef __cplusplus
1210}
1211#endif
1212
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001213void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init( mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1214int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1215 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1216 mbedtls_record *rec,
1217 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1218 void *p_rng );
Hanno Becker605949f2019-07-12 08:23:59 +01001219int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
Hanno Beckera18d1322018-01-03 14:27:32 +00001220 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
1221 mbedtls_record *rec );
1222
Hanno Beckerdd772292020-02-05 10:38:31 +00001223/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
1224static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
1225{
1226#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
1227 if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
1228 return( 2 );
1229#else
1230 ((void) ssl);
1231#endif
1232 return( 0 );
1233}
1234
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001235#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Hanno Becker786300f2020-02-05 10:46:40 +00001236int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001237#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
Hanno Becker0f57a652020-02-05 10:37:26 +00001238
1239void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs );
Hanno Becker7876d122020-02-05 10:39:31 +00001240int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1241
Hanno Becker3e6f8ab2020-02-05 10:40:57 +00001242void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1243void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
1244 mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform );
1245void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1246
Hanno Becker43aefe22020-02-05 10:44:56 +00001247int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial );
1248
Hanno Becker7e8e6a62020-02-05 10:45:48 +00001249#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
1250void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1251#endif
1252
Hanno Beckerce5f5fd2020-02-05 10:47:44 +00001253void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1254
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001255#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
Hanno Becker40cdaa12020-02-05 10:48:27 +00001256int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001257#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
Hanno Becker89490712020-02-05 10:50:12 +00001258
Hanno Becker533ab5f2020-02-05 10:49:13 +00001259#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
Hanno Becker08f09132020-02-11 15:40:07 +00001260size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
Hanno Becker533ab5f2020-02-05 10:49:13 +00001261void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
1262void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free( mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight );
1263#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
1264
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard5e94dde2015-05-26 11:57:05 +02001265#endif /* ssl_internal.h */