diff --git a/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/spm_dfd.puml b/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/spm_dfd.puml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad4996e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/spm_dfd.puml
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/'
+ ' Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
+ '
+ ' SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ '/
+
+/'
+TF-A SPMC Data Flow Diagram
+'/
+
+@startuml
+digraph tfa_dfd {
+
+    # Allow arrows to end on cluster boundaries
+    compound=true
+
+    # Default settings for edges and nodes
+    edge [minlen=2 color="#8c1b07"]
+    node [fillcolor="#ffb866" style=filled shape=box fixedsize=true width=1.6 height=0.7]
+
+    # Nodes outside of the trust boundary
+    nsec [label="NS Client"]
+    ddr  [label="External memory (DDR)"]
+
+    # Trust boundary cluster
+    subgraph cluster_trusted {
+        graph [style=dashed color="#f22430"]
+
+        # HW IPs cluster
+        subgraph cluster_ip {
+            label ="Hardware IPs";
+            graph [style=filled color="#000000" fillcolor="#ffd29e"]
+
+            rank="same"
+            gic [label="GIC" width=1.2 height=0.5]
+            smmu [label="SMMU" width=1.2 height=0.5]
+            uart [label="UART" width=1.2 height=0.5]
+	    pe [label="PE" width=1.2 height=0.5]
+        }
+
+        # TF-A cluster
+        subgraph cluster_tfa {
+            label ="EL3 monitor";
+            graph [style=filled color="#000000" fillcolor="#faf9cd"]
+
+            bl31 [label="BL31" fillcolor="#ddffb3"];
+            spmd [label="SPMD" fillcolor="#ddffb3" height=1]
+        }
+
+        # SPMC cluster
+        subgraph cluster_spmc {
+            label ="SPMC";
+            graph [style=filled color="#000000" fillcolor="#faf9cd"]
+
+            spmc [label="SPMC" fillcolor="#ddffb3" height=1]
+        }
+	bl2 [label="BL2" width=1.2 height=0.5]
+    }
+
+    # Secure Partitions cluster
+    subgraph cluster_sp {
+        label ="Secure Partitions";
+        graph [style=filled color="#000000" fillcolor="#faf9cd"]
+
+        sp1 [label="SP1" fillcolor="#ddffb3" height=1]
+        sp2 [label="SP2" fillcolor="#ddffb3" height=1]
+        spn [label="SP..." fillcolor="#ddffb3" height=1]
+    }
+
+    # Interactions between nodes
+    sp1 -> spmc [dir="both" label="DF1"]
+    spmc -> spmd [dir="both" label="DF2"]
+    spmd -> nsec [dir="both" label="DF3"]
+    sp1 -> sp2 [dir="both" label="DF4"]
+    spmc -> smmu [lhead=cluster_spmc label="DF5"]
+    bl2 -> spmc [lhead=cluster_spmc label="DF6"]
+    bl2 -> spn [lhead=cluster_spmc label="DF6"]
+    sp1 -> ddr [dir="both"  label="DF7"]
+    spmc -> ddr [dir="both"  label="DF7"]
+}
+
+@enduml
diff --git a/docs/resources/diagrams/spm-threat-model-trust-boundaries.png b/docs/resources/diagrams/spm-threat-model-trust-boundaries.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58898c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/resources/diagrams/spm-threat-model-trust-boundaries.png
Binary files differ
diff --git a/docs/threat_model/index.rst b/docs/threat_model/index.rst
index e8f09b9..b5ede69 100644
--- a/docs/threat_model/index.rst
+++ b/docs/threat_model/index.rst
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
 Threat Model
-=============
+============
+
+Threat modeling is an important part of Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)
+that helps us identify potential threats and mitigations affecting a system.
+
+In the next sections, we first give a description of the target of evaluation
+using a data flow diagram. Then we provide a list of threats we have identified
+based on the data flow diagram and potential threat mitigations.
 
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
@@ -7,6 +14,7 @@
    :numbered:
 
    threat_model
+   threat_model_spm
 
 --------------
 
diff --git a/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst b/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst
index 9cee104..9f26487 100644
--- a/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst
+++ b/docs/threat_model/threat_model.rst
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
-*****************
-Introduction
-*****************
-Threat modeling is an important part of Secure Development Lifecycle (SDL)
-that helps us identify potential threats and mitigations affecting a system.
+Generic threat model
+********************
 
-This document provides a generic threat model for TF-A firmware. In the
-next sections, we first give a description of the target of evaluation
-using a data flow diagram. Then we provide a list of threats we have
-identified based on the data flow diagram and potential threat mitigations.
+************************
+Introduction
+************************
+This document provides a generic threat model for TF-A firmware.
 
 ************************
 Target of Evaluation
@@ -781,4 +778,4 @@
 .. _Trusted Board Boot (TBB): https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design/trusted-board-boot.html
 .. _TF-A error handling policy: https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/process/coding-guidelines.html#error-handling-and-robustness
 .. _Secure Development Guidelines: https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/process/security-hardening.html#secure-development-guidelines
-.. _Trusted Firmware-A Tests: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/about/
\ No newline at end of file
+.. _Trusted Firmware-A Tests: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/about/
diff --git a/docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96d33a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/threat_model/threat_model_spm.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,617 @@
+SPMC threat model
+*****************
+
+************************
+Introduction
+************************
+This document provides a threat model for the TF-A `Secure Partition Manager`_
+(SPM) implementation or more generally the S-EL2 reference firmware running on
+systems implementing the FEAT_SEL2 (formerly Armv8.4 Secure EL2) architecture
+extension. The SPM implementation is based on the `Arm Firmware Framework for
+Armv8-A`_ specification.
+
+In brief, the broad FF-A specification and S-EL2 firmware implementation
+provide:
+
+- Isolation of mutually mistrusting SW components, or endpoints in the FF-A
+  terminology.
+- Distinct sandboxes in the secure world called secure partitions. This permits
+  isolation of services from multiple vendors.
+- A standard protocol for communication and memory sharing between FF-A
+  endpoints.
+- Mutual isolation of the normal world and the secure world (e.g. a Trusted OS
+  is prevented to map an arbitrary NS physical memory region such as the kernel
+  or the Hypervisor).
+
+************************
+Target of Evaluation
+************************
+In this threat model, the target of evaluation is the S-EL2 firmware or the
+``Secure Partition Manager Core`` component (SPMC).
+The monitor and SPMD at EL3 are covered by the `Generic TF-A threat model`_.
+
+The scope for this threat model is:
+
+- The TF-A implementation for the S-EL2 SPMC based on the Hafnium hypervisor
+  running in the secure world of TrustZone (at S-EL2 exception level).
+  The threat model is not related to the normal world Hypervisor or VMs.
+  The S-EL1 SPMC solution is not covered.
+- The implementation complies with the FF-A v1.0 specification.
+- Secure partitions are statically provisioned at boot time.
+- Focus on the run-time part of the life-cycle (no specific emphasis on boot
+  time, factory firmware provisioning, firmware udpate etc.)
+- Not covering advanced or invasive physical attacks such as decapsulation,
+  FIB etc.
+- Assumes secure boot or in particular TF-A trusted boot (TBBR or dual CoT) is
+  enabled. An attacker cannot boot arbitrary images that are not approved by the
+  SiP or platform providers.
+
+Data Flow Diagram
+======================
+Figure 1 shows a high-level data flow diagram for the SPM split into an SPMD
+component at EL3 and an SPMC component at S-EL2. The SPMD mostly acts as a
+relayer/pass-through between the normal world and the secure world. It is
+assumed to expose small attack surface.
+
+A description of each diagram element is given in Table 1. In the diagram, the
+red broken lines indicate trust boundaries.
+
+Components outside of the broken lines are considered untrusted.
+
+.. uml:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/spm_dfd.puml
+  :caption: Figure 1: SPMC Data Flow Diagram
+
+.. table:: Table 1: SPMC Data Flow Diagram Description
+
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+  | Diagram Element     | Description                                            |
+  +=====================+========================================================+
+  | ``DF1``             | SP to SPMC communication. FF-A function invocation or  |
+  |                     | implementation-defined Hypervisor call.                |
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+  | ``DF2``             | SPMC to SPMD FF-A call.                                |
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+  | ``DF3``             | SPMD to NS forwarding.                                 |
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+  | ``DF4``             | SP to SP FF-A direct message request/response.         |
+  |                     | Note as a matter of simplifying the diagram            |
+  |                     | the SP to SP communication happens through the SPMC    |
+  |                     | (SP1 performs a direct message request to the          |
+  |                     | SPMC targeting SP2 as destination. And similarly for   |
+  |                     | the direct message response from SP2 to SP1).          |
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+  | ``DF5``             | HW control.                                            |
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+  | ``DF6``             | Bootloader image loading.                              |
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+  | ``DF7``             | External memory access.                                |
+  +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
+
+*********************
+Threat Analysis
+*********************
+
+This threat model follows a similar methodology to the `Generic TF-A threat model`_.
+The following sections define:
+
+- Trust boundaries
+- Assets
+- Theat agents
+- Threat types
+
+Trust boundaries
+============================
+
+- Normal world is untrusted.
+- Secure world and normal world are separate trust boundaries.
+- EL3 monitor, SPMD and SPMC are trusted.
+- Bootloaders (in particular BL1/BL2 if using TF-A) and run-time BL31 are
+  implicitely trusted by the usage of secure boot.
+- EL3 monitor, SPMD, SPMC do not trust SPs.
+
+.. figure:: ../resources/diagrams/spm-threat-model-trust-boundaries.png
+
+    Figure 2: Trust boundaries
+
+Assets
+============================
+
+The following assets are identified:
+
+- SPMC state.
+- SP state.
+- Information exchange between endpoints (partition messages).
+- SPMC secrets (e.g. pointer authentication key when enabled)
+- SP secrets (e.g. application keys).
+- Scheduling cycles.
+- Shared memory.
+
+Threat Agents
+============================
+
+The following threat agents are identified:
+
+- NS-Endpoint identifies a non-secure endpoint: normal world client at NS-EL2
+  (Hypervisor) or NS-EL1 (VM or OS kernel).
+- S-Endpoint identifies a secure endpoint typically a secure partition.
+- Hardware attacks (non-invasive) requiring a physical access to the device,
+  such as bus probing or DRAM stress.
+
+Threat types
+============================
+
+The following threat categories as exposed in the `Generic TF-A threat model`_
+are re-used:
+
+- Spoofing
+- Tampering
+- Repudiation
+- Information disclosure
+- Denial of service
+- Elevation of privileges
+
+Similarly this threat model re-uses the same threat risk ratings. The risk
+analysis is evaluated based on the environment being ``Server`` or ``Mobile``.
+
+Threat Assessment
+============================
+
+The following threats are identified by applying STRIDE analysis on each diagram
+element of the data flow diagram.
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 01                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **An endpoint impersonates the sender or receiver  |
+|                        | FF-A ID in a direct request/response invocation.** |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4                                 |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMD, SPMC                                         |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SP state                                           |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Spoofing                                           |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |   ``Mobile``    |               |
++------------------------+------------------++----------------+---------------+
+| ``Impact``             | Critical(5)      | Critical(5)     |               |
++------------------------+------------------++----------------+---------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Critical(5)      | Critical(5)     |               |
++------------------------+------------------++----------------+---------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Critical(25)     | Critical(25)    |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat.       |
+|                        | The guidance below is left for a system integrator |
+|                        | to implemented as necessary.                       |
+|                        | The SPMC must enforce checks in the direct message |
+|                        | request/response interfaces such an endpoint cannot|
+|                        | spoof the origin and destination worlds (e.g. a NWd|
+|                        | originated message directed to the SWd cannot use a|
+|                        | SWd ID as the sender ID).                          |
+|                        | Additionally a software component residing in the  |
+|                        | SPMC can be added for the purpose of direct        |
+|                        | request/response filtering.                        |
+|                        | It can be configured with the list of known IDs    |
+|                        | and about which interaction can occur between one  |
+|                        | and another endpoint (e.g. which NWd endpoint ID   |
+|                        | sends a direct request to which SWd endpoint ID).  |
+|                        | This component checks the sender/receiver fields   |
+|                        | for a legitimate communication between endpoints.  |
+|                        | A similar component can exist in the OS kernel     |
+|                        | driver, or Hypervisor although it remains untrusted|
+|                        | by the SPMD/SPMC.                                  |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 02                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **Tampering with memory shared between an endpoint |
+|                        | and the SPMC.**                                    |
+|                        | A malicious endpoint may attempt tampering with its|
+|                        | RX/TX buffer contents while the SPMC is processing |
+|                        | it (TOCTOU).                                       |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF3, DF4, DF7                                 |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | Shared memory, Information exchange                |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering                                          |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |   ``Mobile``    |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Impact``             | High (4)         | High (4)        |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | High (4)         | High (4)        |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (16)        | High (16)       |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | In context of FF-A v1.0 this is the case of sharing|
+|                        | the RX/TX buffer pair and usage in the             |
+|                        | PARTITION_INFO_GET or mem sharing primitives.      |
+|                        | The SPMC must copy the contents of the TX buffer   |
+|                        | to an internal temporary buffer before processing  |
+|                        | its contents. The SPMC must implement hardened     |
+|                        | input validation on data transmitted through the TX|
+|                        | buffer by an untrusted endpoint.                   |
+|                        | The TF-A SPMC mitigates this threat by enforcing   |
+|                        | checks on data transmitted through RX/TX buffers.  |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 03                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **An endpoint may tamper with its own state or the |
+|                        | state of another endpoint.**                       |
+|                        | A malicious endpoint may attempt violating:        |
+|                        | - its own or another SP state by using an unusual  |
+|                        | combination (or out-of-order) FF-A function        |
+|                        | invocations.                                       |
+|                        | This can also be an endpoint emitting              |
+|                        | FF-A function invocations to another endpoint while|
+|                        | the latter in not in a state to receive it (e.g. a |
+|                        | SP sends a direct request to the normal world early|
+|                        | while the normal world is not booted yet).         |
+|                        | - the SPMC state itself by employing unexpected    |
+|                        | transitions in FF-A memory sharing, direct requests|
+|                        | and responses, or handling of interrupts.          |
+|                        | This can be led by random stimuli injection or     |
+|                        | fuzzing.                                           |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4                                 |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMD, SPMC                                         |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SP state, SPMC state                               |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering                                          |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |   ``Mobile``    |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Impact``             | High (4)         | High (4)        |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (12)        | High (12)       |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | The SPMC may be vulnerable to invalid state        |
+|                        | transitions for itself or while handling an SP     |
+|                        | state. The FF-A v1.1 specification provides a      |
+|                        | guidance on those state transitions (run-time      |
+|                        | model). The TF-A SPMC will be hardened in future   |
+|                        | releases to follow this guidance.                  |
+|                        | Additionally The TF-A SPMC mitigates the threat by |
+|                        | runs of the Arm `FF-A ACS`_ compliance test suite. |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 04                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | *An attacker may attempt injecting errors by the   |
+|                        | use of external DRAM stress techniques.**          |
+|                        | A malicious agent may attempt toggling an SP       |
+|                        | Stage-2 MMU descriptor bit within the page tables  |
+|                        | that the SPMC manages. This can happen in Rowhammer|
+|                        | types of attack.                                   |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF7                                                |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SP or SPMC state                                   |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | Hardware attack                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering                                          |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |  ``Mobile``   |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Impact``             | High (4)         | High (4)	    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Low (2)          | Medium (3)    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Medium (8)       | High (12)	    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | The TF-A SPMC does not provide mitigations to this |
+|                        | type of attack. It can be addressed by the use of  |
+|                        | dedicated HW circuity or hardening at the chipset  |
+|                        | or platform level left to the integrator.          |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 05                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **Protection of the SPMC from a DMA capable device |
+|                        | upstream to an SMMU.**                             |
+|                        | A device may attempt to tamper with the internal   |
+|                        | SPMC code/data sections.                           |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF5                                                |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SPMC or SP state                                   |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Tampering, Elevation of privileges                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |  ``Mobile``   |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Impact``             | High (4)         | High (4)      |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (12)        | High (12)     |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | A platform may prefer assigning boot time,         |
+|                        | statically alocated memory regions through the SMMU|
+|                        | configuration and page tables. The FF-A v1.1       |
+|                        | specification provisions this capability through   |
+|                        | static DMA isolation.                              |
+|                        | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat.       |
+|                        | It will adopt the static DMA isolation approach in |
+|                        | a future release.                                  |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 06                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **Replay fragments of past communication between   |
+|                        | endpoints.**                                       |
+|                        | A malicious endpoint may replay a message exchange |
+|                        | that occured between two legitimate endpoint as    |
+|                        | a matter of triggering a malfunction or extracting |
+|                        | secrets from the receiving endpoint. In particular |
+|                        | the memory sharing operation with fragmented       |
+|                        | messages between an endpoint and the SPMC may be   |
+|                        | replayed by a malicious agent as a matter of       |
+|                        | getting access or gaining permissions to a memory  |
+|                        | region which does not belong to this agent.        |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF2, DF3                                           |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | Information exchange                               |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Repdudiation                                       |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |  ``Mobile``   |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | High (4)         | High (4)	    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (12)        | High (12)     |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat.       |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 07                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **A malicious endpoint may attempt to extract data |
+|                        | or state information by the use of invalid or      |
+|                        | incorrect input arguments.**                       |
+|                        | Lack of input parameter validation or side effects |
+|                        | of maliciously forged input parameters might affect|
+|                        | the SPMC.                                          |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4                                 |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMD, SPMC                                         |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SP secrets, SPMC secrets, SP state, SPMC state     |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Information discolure                              |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |  ``Mobile``   |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Impact``             | High (4)         | High (4)      |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | High (12)        | High (12)     |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | Secure Partitions must follow security standards   |
+|                        | and best practises as a way to mitigate the risk   |
+|                        | of common vulnerabilities to be exploited.         |
+|                        | The use of software (canaries) or hardware         |
+|                        | hardening techniques (XN, WXN, BTI, pointer        |
+|                        | authentication, MTE) helps detecting and stopping  |
+|                        | an exploitation early.                             |
+|                        | The TF-A SPMC mitigates this threat by implementing|
+|                        | stack protector, pointer authentication, BTI, XN,  |
+|                        | WXN, security hardening techniques.                |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 08                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **A malicious endpoint may forge a direct message  |
+|                        | request such that it reveals the internal state of |
+|                        | another endpoint through the direct message        |
+|                        | response.**                                        |
+|                        | The secure partition or SPMC replies to a partition|
+|                        | message by a direct message response with          |
+|                        | information which may reveal its internal state    |
+|                        | (.e.g. partition message response outside of       |
+|                        | allowed bounds).                                   |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4                                 |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SPMC or SP state                                   |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Information discolure                              |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |  ``Mobile``   |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Low (2)          | Low (2)	    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Medium (6)       | Medium (6)    |                 |
++------------------------+------------------+---------------+-----------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | For the specific case of direct requests targetting|
+|                        | the SPMC, the latter is hardened to prevent        |
+|                        | its internal state or the state of an SP to be     |
+|                        | revealed through a direct message response.        |
+|                        | Further FF-A v1.1 guidance about run time models   |
+|                        | and partition states will be implemented in future |
+|                        | TF-A SPMC releases.                                |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 09                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **Probing the FF-A communication between           |
+|                        | endpoints.**                                       |
+|                        | SPMC and SPs are typically loaded to external      |
+|                        | memory (protected by a TrustZone memory            |
+|                        | controller). A malicious agent may use non invasive|
+|                        | methods to probe the external memory bus and       |
+|                        | extract the traffic between an SP and the SPMC or  |
+|                        | among SPs when shared buffers are held in external |
+|                        | memory.                                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF7                                                |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SP/SPMC state, SP/SPMC secrets                     |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | Hardware attack                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Information disclosure                             |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |   ``Mobile``    |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Low (2)          | Medium (3)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Medium (6)       | Medium (9)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | It is expected the platform or chipset provides    |
+|                        | guarantees in protecting the DRAM contents.        |
+|                        | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this class of      |
+|                        | attack and this is left to the integrator.         |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 10                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **A malicious agent may attempt revealing the SPMC |
+|                        | state or secrets by the use of software-based cache|
+|                        | side-channel attack techniques.**                  |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF7                                                |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SP or SPMC state                                   |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Information disclosure                             |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |   ``Mobile``    |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Low (2)          | Low (2)         |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Medium (6)       | Medium (6)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | From an integration perspective it is assumed      |
+|                        | platforms consuming the SPMC component at S-EL2    |
+|                        | (hence implementing the Armv8.4 FEAT_SEL2          |
+|                        | architecture extension) implement mitigations to   |
+|                        | Spectre, Meltdown or other cache timing            |
+|                        | side-channel type of attacks.                      |
+|                        | The TF-A SPMC implements one mitigation (barrier   |
+|                        | preventing speculation past exeception returns).   |
+|                        | The SPMC may be hardened further with SW           |
+|                        | mitigations (e.g. speculation barriers) for the    |
+|                        | cases not covered in HW. Usage of hardened         |
+|                        | compilers and appropriate options, code inspection |
+|                        | are recommended ways to mitigate Spectre types of  |
+|                        | attacks. For non-hardened cores, the usage of      |
+|                        | techniques such a kernel page table isolation can  |
+|                        | help mitigating Meltdown type of attacks.          |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ID                     | 11                                                 |
++========================+====================================================+
+| ``Threat``             | **A malicious endpoint may attempt flooding the    |
+|                        | SPMC with requests targetting a service within an  |
+|                        | endpoint such that it denies another endpoint to   |
+|                        | access this service.**                             |
+|                        | Similarly, the malicious endpoint may target a     |
+|                        | a service within an endpoint such that the latter  |
+|                        | is unable to request services from another         |
+|                        | endpoint.                                          |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Diagram Elements``   | DF1, DF2, DF3, DF4                                 |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Affected TF-A        | SPMC                                               |
+| Components``           |                                                    |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Assets``             | SPMC state                                         |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Agent``       | NS-Endpoint, S-Endpoint                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+| ``Threat Type``        | Denial of service                                  |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Application``        |   ``Server``     |   ``Mobile``    |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Impact``             | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Likelihood``         | Medium (3)       | Medium (3)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Total Risk Rating``  | Medium (9)       | Medium (9)      |               |
++------------------------+------------------+-----------------+---------------+
+| ``Mitigations``        | The TF-A SPMC does not mitigate this threat.       |
+|                        | Bounding the time for operations to complete can   |
+|                        | be achieved by the usage of a trusted watchdog.    |
+|                        | Other quality of service monitoring can be achieved|
+|                        | in the SPMC such as counting a number of operations|
+|                        | in a limited timeframe.                            |
++------------------------+----------------------------------------------------+
+
+--------------
+
+*Copyright (c) 2021, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+
+.. _Arm Firmware Framework for Armv8-A: https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0077/latest
+.. _Secure Partition Manager: ../components/secure-partition-manager.html
+.. _Generic TF-A threat model: ./threat_model.html#threat-analysis
+.. _FF-A ACS: https://github.com/ARM-software/ff-a-acs/releases