Rename and reorder function parameters
Signed-off-by: Gabor Mezei <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
diff --git a/library/constant_time.c b/library/constant_time.c
index 85e0e76..1ea79de 100644
--- a/library/constant_time.c
+++ b/library/constant_time.c
@@ -310,19 +310,19 @@
dest[i] = ( src[i] & mask ) | ( dest[i] & ~mask );
}
-void mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dst,
- const unsigned char *src_base,
- size_t offset_secret,
+void mbedtls_cf_memcpy_offset( unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t offset,
size_t offset_min,
size_t offset_max,
size_t len )
{
- size_t offset;
+ size_t offsetval;
- for( offset = offset_min; offset <= offset_max; offset++ )
+ for( offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++ )
{
- mbedtls_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dst, src_base + offset, len,
- offset, offset_secret );
+ mbedtls_cf_memcpy_if_eq( dest, src + offsetval, len,
+ offsetval, offset );
}
}
@@ -564,11 +564,11 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
int mbedtls_cf_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding( int mode,
+ unsigned char *input,
size_t ilen,
- size_t *olen,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len,
- unsigned char *buf )
+ size_t *olen )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i, plaintext_max_size;
@@ -594,19 +594,19 @@
/* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
* memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
- bad |= buf[0];
+ bad |= input[0];
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE )
{
/* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
* where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
- bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
+ bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
- pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
+ pad_done |= ((input[i] | (unsigned char)-input[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
}
}
@@ -614,16 +614,16 @@
{
/* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00
* where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */
- bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
+ bad |= input[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count.
* If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
- pad_done |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( buf[i], 0, 1 );
+ pad_done |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( input[i], 0, 1 );
pad_count += mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, 1 );
- bad |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
+ bad |= mbedtls_cf_uint_if( pad_done, 0, input[i] ^ 0xFF );
}
}
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@
* through memory or cache access patterns. */
bad = mbedtls_cf_uint_mask( bad | output_too_large );
for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
- buf[i] &= ~bad;
+ input[i] &= ~bad;
/* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@
* does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
* starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
* information. */
- mbedtls_cf_mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
+ mbedtls_cf_mem_move_to_left( input + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
plaintext_max_size,
plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@
* length, validity of padding, success of the decryption, and other
* secrets. */
if( output_max_len != 0 )
- memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
+ memcpy( output, input + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
/* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
* of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen