Gilles Peskine | 9013b81 | 2023-09-18 12:42:37 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* BEGIN_HEADER */ |
| 2 | /* Testing of mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() specifically, focusing on negative |
| 3 | * testing (using malformed inputs). */ |
| 4 | |
Gilles Peskine | dc48f6e | 2023-09-18 14:05:55 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 5 | #include <mbedtls/cipher.h> |
Gilles Peskine | 9013b81 | 2023-09-18 12:42:37 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 6 | #include <mbedtls/ssl.h> |
| 7 | #include <test/ssl_helpers.h> |
| 8 | |
| 9 | /* END_HEADER */ |
| 10 | |
| 11 | /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES |
| 12 | * depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C |
| 13 | * END_DEPENDENCIES |
| 14 | */ |
| 15 | |
Gilles Peskine | dc48f6e | 2023-09-18 14:05:55 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 16 | /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */ |
| 17 | void ssl_decrypt_stream(int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac) |
| 18 | { |
| 19 | mbedtls_ssl_transform transform_in, transform_out; |
| 20 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_in); |
| 21 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&transform_out); |
| 22 | mbedtls_record rec_good = { |
| 23 | .ctr = { 0 }, |
| 24 | .type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA, |
| 25 | /* For simplicity, we only test one protocol version (TLS 1.2). |
| 26 | * For stream ciphers (unlike CBC), there are no changes in the |
| 27 | * data record format between SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.2 inclusive, so |
| 28 | * testing a single version should be good enough. */ |
| 29 | .ver = { MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3, MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 }, |
| 30 | .buf = NULL, |
| 31 | .buf_len = 0, |
| 32 | .data_offset = 0, |
| 33 | .data_len = 0, |
| 34 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) |
| 35 | .cid_len = 0, |
| 36 | .cid = { 0 }, |
| 37 | #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ |
| 38 | }; |
| 39 | const char sample_plaintext[3] = "ABC"; |
| 40 | mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher; |
| 41 | mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher); |
| 42 | mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; |
| 43 | mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl); |
| 44 | uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| 45 | |
| 46 | USE_PSA_INIT(); |
| 47 | |
| 48 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&transform_in, &transform_out, |
| 49 | cipher_type, hash_id, |
| 50 | 0, trunc_hmac, |
| 51 | rec_good.ver[1], |
| 52 | 0, 0), 0); |
| 53 | |
| 54 | const size_t plaintext_length = sizeof(sample_plaintext); |
| 55 | rec_good.buf_len = plaintext_length + transform_in.maclen; |
| 56 | rec_good.data_len = plaintext_length; |
| 57 | TEST_CALLOC(rec_good.buf, rec_good.buf_len); |
| 58 | memcpy(rec_good.buf, sample_plaintext, plaintext_length); |
| 59 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec_good, |
| 60 | &transform_out), 0); |
| 61 | |
| 62 | /* Encrypt in place */ |
| 63 | size_t len; |
| 64 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&transform_out.cipher_ctx_enc, |
| 65 | transform_out.iv_enc, transform_out.ivlen, |
| 66 | rec_good.buf + rec_good.data_offset, |
| 67 | rec_good.data_len, |
| 68 | rec_good.buf + rec_good.data_offset, |
| 69 | &len), 0); |
| 70 | /* This function only supports stream ciphers, which should preserve |
| 71 | * the length. */ |
| 72 | TEST_EQUAL(len, rec_good.data_len); |
| 73 | |
| 74 | /* Good case */ |
| 75 | mbedtls_record rec = rec_good; |
| 76 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), 0); |
| 77 | |
| 78 | /* Change any one byte of the plaintext or MAC. The MAC will be wrong. */ |
| 79 | TEST_CALLOC(buf, rec.buf_len); |
| 80 | for (size_t i = 0; i < rec.buf_len; i++) { |
| 81 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); |
| 82 | rec = rec_good; |
| 83 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 84 | memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, rec.buf_len); |
| 85 | buf[i] ^= 1; |
| 86 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), |
| 87 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC); |
| 88 | } |
| 89 | mbedtls_free(buf); |
| 90 | buf = NULL; |
| 91 | |
| 92 | /* Shorter input buffer. Either the MAC will be wrong, or there isn't |
| 93 | * enough room for a MAC. */ |
| 94 | for (size_t n = 1; n < rec.buf_len; n++) { |
| 95 | mbedtls_test_set_step(n); |
| 96 | rec = rec_good; |
| 97 | TEST_CALLOC(buf, n); |
| 98 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 99 | rec.buf_len = n; |
| 100 | rec.data_len = n; |
| 101 | memcpy(buf, rec_good.buf, n); |
| 102 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), |
| 103 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC); |
| 104 | mbedtls_free(buf); |
| 105 | buf = NULL; |
| 106 | } |
| 107 | |
| 108 | /* For robustness, check a 0-length buffer (non-null, then null). |
| 109 | * This should not reach mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf() as used in the library, |
| 110 | * so the exact error doesn't matter, but we don't want a crash. */ |
| 111 | { |
| 112 | const uint8_t buf1[1] = { 'a' }; |
| 113 | rec = rec_good; |
| 114 | /* We won't write to buf1[0] since it's out of range, so we can cast |
| 115 | * the const away. */ |
| 116 | rec.buf = (uint8_t *) buf1; |
| 117 | rec.buf_len = 0; |
| 118 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), |
| 119 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 120 | } |
| 121 | rec = rec_good; |
| 122 | rec.buf = NULL; |
| 123 | rec.buf_len = 0; |
| 124 | TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &transform_in, &rec), |
| 125 | MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| 126 | |
| 127 | exit: |
| 128 | USE_PSA_DONE(); |
| 129 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_in); |
| 130 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&transform_out); |
| 131 | mbedtls_free(rec_good.buf); |
| 132 | mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl); |
| 133 | mbedtls_cipher_free(&cipher); |
| 134 | mbedtls_free(buf); |
| 135 | } |
| 136 | /* END_CASE */ |
| 137 | |
Gilles Peskine | 9013b81 | 2023-09-18 12:42:37 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 138 | /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
| 139 | void ssl_decrypt_non_etm_cbc(int cipher_type, int hash_id, int trunc_hmac, |
| 140 | int length_selector) |
| 141 | { |
| 142 | /* |
| 143 | * Test record decryption for CBC without EtM, focused on the verification |
| 144 | * of padding and MAC. |
| 145 | * |
| 146 | * Actually depends on TLS >= 1.0 (SSL 3.0 computes the MAC differently), |
| 147 | * and either AES, ARIA, Camellia or DES, but since the test framework |
| 148 | * doesn't support alternation in dependency statements, just depend on |
| 149 | * TLS 1.2 and AES. |
| 150 | * |
| 151 | * The length_selector argument is interpreted as follows: |
| 152 | * - if it's -1, the plaintext length is 0 and minimal padding is applied |
| 153 | * - if it's -2, the plaintext length is 0 and maximal padding is applied |
| 154 | * - otherwise it must be in [0, 255] and is padding_length from RFC 5246: |
| 155 | * it's the length of the rest of the padding, that is, excluding the |
| 156 | * byte that encodes the length. The minimal non-zero plaintext length |
| 157 | * that gives this padding_length is automatically selected. |
| 158 | */ |
| 159 | mbedtls_ssl_context ssl; /* ONLY for debugging */ |
| 160 | mbedtls_ssl_transform t0, t1; |
| 161 | mbedtls_record rec, rec_save; |
| 162 | unsigned char *buf = NULL, *buf_save = NULL; |
| 163 | size_t buflen, olen = 0; |
| 164 | size_t plaintext_len, block_size, i; |
| 165 | unsigned char padlen; /* excluding the padding_length byte */ |
Gilles Peskine | 9013b81 | 2023-09-18 12:42:37 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 166 | int exp_ret; |
| 167 | const unsigned char pad_max_len = 255; /* Per the standard */ |
| 168 | |
| 169 | mbedtls_ssl_init(&ssl); |
| 170 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t0); |
| 171 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(&t1); |
| 172 | USE_PSA_INIT(); |
| 173 | |
| 174 | /* Set up transforms with dummy keys */ |
| 175 | TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_build_transforms(&t0, &t1, cipher_type, hash_id, |
| 176 | 0, trunc_hmac, |
| 177 | MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3, |
| 178 | 0, 0) == 0); |
| 179 | |
| 180 | /* Determine padding/plaintext length */ |
| 181 | TEST_ASSERT(length_selector >= -2 && length_selector <= 255); |
| 182 | block_size = t0.ivlen; |
| 183 | if (length_selector < 0) { |
| 184 | plaintext_len = 0; |
| 185 | |
| 186 | /* Minimal padding |
| 187 | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ |
| 188 | padlen = block_size - (t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; |
| 189 | |
| 190 | /* Maximal padding? */ |
| 191 | if (length_selector == -2) { |
| 192 | padlen += block_size * ((pad_max_len - padlen) / block_size); |
| 193 | } |
| 194 | } else { |
| 195 | padlen = length_selector; |
| 196 | |
| 197 | /* Minimal non-zero plaintext_length giving desired padding. |
| 198 | * The +1 is for the padding_length byte, not counted in padlen. */ |
| 199 | plaintext_len = block_size - (padlen + t0.maclen + 1) % block_size; |
| 200 | } |
| 201 | |
| 202 | /* Prepare a buffer for record data */ |
| 203 | buflen = block_size |
| 204 | + plaintext_len |
| 205 | + t0.maclen |
| 206 | + padlen + 1; |
| 207 | TEST_CALLOC(buf, buflen); |
| 208 | TEST_CALLOC(buf_save, buflen); |
| 209 | |
| 210 | /* Prepare a dummy record header */ |
| 211 | memset(rec.ctr, 0, sizeof(rec.ctr)); |
| 212 | rec.type = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; |
| 213 | rec.ver[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; |
| 214 | rec.ver[1] = MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3; |
| 215 | #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) |
| 216 | rec.cid_len = 0; |
| 217 | #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ |
| 218 | |
| 219 | /* Prepare dummy record content */ |
| 220 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 221 | rec.buf_len = buflen; |
| 222 | rec.data_offset = block_size; |
| 223 | rec.data_len = plaintext_len; |
| 224 | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset, 42, rec.data_len); |
| 225 | |
Gilles Peskine | 9013b81 | 2023-09-18 12:42:37 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 226 | /* Set dummy IV */ |
| 227 | memset(t0.iv_enc, 0x55, t0.ivlen); |
| 228 | memcpy(rec.buf, t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen); |
| 229 | |
| 230 | /* |
| 231 | * Prepare a pre-encryption record (with MAC and padding), and save it. |
| 232 | */ |
Gilles Peskine | 2198cc5 | 2023-09-18 13:11:50 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 233 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_test_ssl_prepare_record_mac(&rec, &t0)); |
Gilles Peskine | 9013b81 | 2023-09-18 12:42:37 +0200 | [diff] [blame] | 234 | |
| 235 | /* Pad */ |
| 236 | memset(rec.buf + rec.data_offset + rec.data_len, padlen, padlen + 1); |
| 237 | rec.data_len += padlen + 1; |
| 238 | |
| 239 | /* Save correct pre-encryption record */ |
| 240 | rec_save = rec; |
| 241 | rec_save.buf = buf_save; |
| 242 | memcpy(buf_save, buf, buflen); |
| 243 | |
| 244 | /* |
| 245 | * Encrypt and decrypt the correct record, expecting success |
| 246 | */ |
| 247 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&t0.cipher_ctx_enc, |
| 248 | t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, |
| 249 | rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len, |
| 250 | rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); |
| 251 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; |
| 252 | rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; |
| 253 | |
| 254 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); |
| 255 | |
| 256 | /* |
| 257 | * Modify each byte of the pre-encryption record before encrypting and |
| 258 | * decrypting it, expecting failure every time. |
| 259 | */ |
| 260 | for (i = block_size; i < buflen; i++) { |
| 261 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); |
| 262 | |
| 263 | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ |
| 264 | rec = rec_save; |
| 265 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 266 | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); |
| 267 | |
| 268 | /* Corrupt one byte of the data (could be plaintext, MAC or padding) */ |
| 269 | rec.buf[i] ^= 0x01; |
| 270 | |
| 271 | /* Encrypt */ |
| 272 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&t0.cipher_ctx_enc, |
| 273 | t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, |
| 274 | rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len, |
| 275 | rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); |
| 276 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; |
| 277 | rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; |
| 278 | |
| 279 | /* Decrypt and expect failure */ |
| 280 | TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC, |
| 281 | mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | |
| 284 | /* |
| 285 | * Use larger values of the padding bytes - with small buffers, this tests |
| 286 | * the case where the announced padlen would be larger than the buffer |
| 287 | * (and before that, than the buffer minus the size of the MAC), to make |
| 288 | * sure our padding checking code does not perform any out-of-bounds reads |
| 289 | * in this case. (With larger buffers, ie when the plaintext is long or |
| 290 | * maximal length padding is used, this is less relevant but still doesn't |
| 291 | * hurt to test.) |
| 292 | * |
| 293 | * (Start the loop with correct padding, just to double-check that record |
| 294 | * saving did work, and that we're overwriting the correct bytes.) |
| 295 | */ |
| 296 | for (i = padlen; i <= pad_max_len; i++) { |
| 297 | mbedtls_test_set_step(i); |
| 298 | |
| 299 | /* Restore correct pre-encryption record */ |
| 300 | rec = rec_save; |
| 301 | rec.buf = buf; |
| 302 | memcpy(buf, buf_save, buflen); |
| 303 | |
| 304 | /* Set padding bytes to new value */ |
| 305 | memset(buf + buflen - padlen - 1, i, padlen + 1); |
| 306 | |
| 307 | /* Encrypt */ |
| 308 | TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&t0.cipher_ctx_enc, |
| 309 | t0.iv_enc, t0.ivlen, |
| 310 | rec.buf + rec.data_offset, rec.data_len, |
| 311 | rec.buf + rec.data_offset, &olen)); |
| 312 | rec.data_offset -= t0.ivlen; |
| 313 | rec.data_len += t0.ivlen; |
| 314 | |
| 315 | /* Decrypt and expect failure except the first time */ |
| 316 | exp_ret = (i == padlen) ? 0 : MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC; |
| 317 | TEST_EQUAL(exp_ret, mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(&ssl, &t1, &rec)); |
| 318 | } |
| 319 | |
| 320 | exit: |
| 321 | mbedtls_ssl_free(&ssl); |
| 322 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t0); |
| 323 | mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(&t1); |
| 324 | mbedtls_free(buf); |
| 325 | mbedtls_free(buf_save); |
| 326 | USE_PSA_DONE(); |
| 327 | } |
| 328 | /* END_CASE */ |