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Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001/*
2 * The RSA public-key cryptosystem
3 *
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01004 * Copyright (C) 2006-2014, Brainspark B.V.
Paul Bakkerb96f1542010-07-18 20:36:00 +00005 *
6 * This file is part of PolarSSL (http://www.polarssl.org)
Paul Bakker84f12b72010-07-18 10:13:04 +00007 * Lead Maintainer: Paul Bakker <polarssl_maintainer at polarssl.org>
Paul Bakkerb96f1542010-07-18 20:36:00 +00008 *
Paul Bakker77b385e2009-07-28 17:23:11 +00009 * All rights reserved.
Paul Bakkere0ccd0a2009-01-04 16:27:10 +000010 *
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000011 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
12 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
13 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
14 * (at your option) any later version.
15 *
16 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
17 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
18 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
19 * GNU General Public License for more details.
20 *
21 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
22 * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
23 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
24 */
25/*
26 * RSA was designed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman.
27 *
28 * http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/rsapaper.pdf
29 * http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/about/chap8.pdf
30 */
31
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000032#include "polarssl/config.h"
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000033
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000034#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_C)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000035
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000036#include "polarssl/rsa.h"
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +020037#include "polarssl/oid.h"
Paul Bakkerbb51f0c2012-08-23 07:46:58 +000038
39#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +000040#include "polarssl/md.h"
Paul Bakkerbb51f0c2012-08-23 07:46:58 +000041#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000042
43#include <stdlib.h>
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000044#include <stdio.h>
45
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +010046#if defined(POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C)
47#include "polarssl/platform.h"
48#else
49#define polarssl_printf printf
50#endif
51
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000052/*
53 * Initialize an RSA context
54 */
55void rsa_init( rsa_context *ctx,
56 int padding,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000057 int hash_id )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000058{
59 memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( rsa_context ) );
60
61 ctx->padding = padding;
62 ctx->hash_id = hash_id;
Paul Bakkerc9965dc2013-09-29 14:58:17 +020063
64#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
65 polarssl_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex );
66#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000067}
68
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000069#if defined(POLARSSL_GENPRIME)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000070
71/*
72 * Generate an RSA keypair
73 */
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000074int rsa_gen_key( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +000075 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
76 void *p_rng,
77 unsigned int nbits, int exponent )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000078{
79 int ret;
80 mpi P1, Q1, H, G;
81
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000082 if( f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +000083 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000084
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +000085 mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 ); mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &G );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000086
87 /*
88 * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that:
89 * GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1
90 */
91 MPI_CHK( mpi_lset( &ctx->E, exponent ) );
92
93 do
94 {
95 MPI_CHK( mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, ( nbits + 1 ) >> 1, 0,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000096 f_rng, p_rng ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +000097
98 MPI_CHK( mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, ( nbits + 1 ) >> 1, 0,
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +000099 f_rng, p_rng ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000100
101 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) < 0 )
102 mpi_swap( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q );
103
104 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) == 0 )
105 continue;
106
107 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
108 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) != nbits )
109 continue;
110
111 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
112 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
113 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) );
114 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
115 }
116 while( mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 );
117
118 /*
119 * D = E^-1 mod ((P-1)*(Q-1))
120 * DP = D mod (P - 1)
121 * DQ = D mod (Q - 1)
122 * QP = Q^-1 mod P
123 */
124 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D , &ctx->E, &H ) );
125 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->DP, &ctx->D, &P1 ) );
126 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1 ) );
127 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P ) );
128
129 ctx->len = ( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) + 7 ) >> 3;
130
131cleanup:
132
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000133 mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 ); mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &G );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000134
135 if( ret != 0 )
136 {
137 rsa_free( ctx );
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000138 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000139 }
140
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200141 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000142}
143
144#endif
145
146/*
147 * Check a public RSA key
148 */
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000149int rsa_check_pubkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000150{
Paul Bakker37940d92009-07-10 22:38:58 +0000151 if( !ctx->N.p || !ctx->E.p )
152 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
153
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200154 if( ( ctx->N.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 ||
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000155 ( ctx->E.p[0] & 1 ) == 0 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000156 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000157
158 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) < 128 ||
Paul Bakkerfe3256e2011-11-25 12:11:43 +0000159 mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) > POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_BITS )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000160 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000161
162 if( mpi_msb( &ctx->E ) < 2 ||
163 mpi_msb( &ctx->E ) > 64 )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000164 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000165
166 return( 0 );
167}
168
169/*
170 * Check a private RSA key
171 */
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000172int rsa_check_privkey( const rsa_context *ctx )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000173{
174 int ret;
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000175 mpi PQ, DE, P1, Q1, H, I, G, G2, L1, L2, DP, DQ, QP;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000176
177 if( ( ret = rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) ) != 0 )
178 return( ret );
179
Paul Bakker37940d92009-07-10 22:38:58 +0000180 if( !ctx->P.p || !ctx->Q.p || !ctx->D.p )
181 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED );
182
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000183 mpi_init( &PQ ); mpi_init( &DE ); mpi_init( &P1 ); mpi_init( &Q1 );
184 mpi_init( &H ); mpi_init( &I ); mpi_init( &G ); mpi_init( &G2 );
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000185 mpi_init( &L1 ); mpi_init( &L2 ); mpi_init( &DP ); mpi_init( &DQ );
186 mpi_init( &QP );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000187
188 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
189 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &DE, &ctx->D, &ctx->E ) );
190 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P, 1 ) );
191 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q, 1 ) );
192 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &P1, &Q1 ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000193 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E, &H ) );
194
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000195 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &G2, &P1, &Q1 ) );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200196 MPI_CHK( mpi_div_mpi( &L1, &L2, &H, &G2 ) );
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000197 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &I, &DE, &L1 ) );
198
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000199 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &DP, &ctx->D, &P1 ) );
200 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &DQ, &ctx->D, &Q1 ) );
201 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &QP, &ctx->Q, &ctx->P ) );
Paul Bakkerb572adf2010-07-18 08:29:32 +0000202 /*
203 * Check for a valid PKCS1v2 private key
204 */
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000205 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &PQ, &ctx->N ) != 0 ||
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000206 mpi_cmp_mpi( &DP, &ctx->DP ) != 0 ||
207 mpi_cmp_mpi( &DQ, &ctx->DQ ) != 0 ||
208 mpi_cmp_mpi( &QP, &ctx->QP ) != 0 ||
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000209 mpi_cmp_int( &L2, 0 ) != 0 ||
210 mpi_cmp_int( &I, 1 ) != 0 ||
211 mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000212 {
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000213 ret = POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000214 }
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200215
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000216cleanup:
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000217 mpi_free( &PQ ); mpi_free( &DE ); mpi_free( &P1 ); mpi_free( &Q1 );
218 mpi_free( &H ); mpi_free( &I ); mpi_free( &G ); mpi_free( &G2 );
Paul Bakker321df6f2012-09-27 13:21:34 +0000219 mpi_free( &L1 ); mpi_free( &L2 ); mpi_free( &DP ); mpi_free( &DQ );
220 mpi_free( &QP );
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000221
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000222 if( ret == POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED )
223 return( ret );
224
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000225 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000226 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000227
228 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000229}
230
231/*
232 * Do an RSA public key operation
233 */
234int rsa_public( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000235 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000236 unsigned char *output )
237{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000238 int ret;
239 size_t olen;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000240 mpi T;
241
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000242 mpi_init( &T );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000243
244 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
245
246 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
247 {
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000248 mpi_free( &T );
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000249 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000250 }
251
252 olen = ctx->len;
253 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
254 MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
255
256cleanup:
257
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000258 mpi_free( &T );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000259
260 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000261 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000262
263 return( 0 );
264}
265
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200266#if !defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
267/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200268 * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of:
269 * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
270 * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’96. Springer
271 * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200272 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200273static int rsa_prepare_blinding( rsa_context *ctx, mpi *Vi, mpi *Vf,
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200274 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
275{
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard4d89c7e2013-10-04 15:18:38 +0200276 int ret, count = 0;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200277
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200278#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
279 polarssl_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex );
280#endif
281
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200282 if( ctx->Vf.p != NULL )
283 {
284 /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */
285 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard735b8fc2013-09-13 12:57:23 +0200286 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->N ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200287 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard735b8fc2013-09-13 12:57:23 +0200288 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200289
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200290 goto done;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard8a109f12013-09-10 13:37:26 +0200291 }
292
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard4d89c7e2013-10-04 15:18:38 +0200293 /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */
294 do {
295 if( count++ > 10 )
296 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED );
297
298 MPI_CHK( mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf, ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) );
299 MPI_CHK( mpi_gcd( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
300 } while( mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi, 1 ) != 0 );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200301
302 /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N */
303 MPI_CHK( mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N ) );
304 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
305
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200306done:
307 if( Vi != &ctx->Vi )
308 {
309 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( Vi, &ctx->Vi ) );
310 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( Vf, &ctx->Vf ) );
311 }
312
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200313cleanup:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200314#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
315 polarssl_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex );
316#endif
317
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200318 return( ret );
319}
320#endif
321
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000322/*
323 * Do an RSA private key operation
324 */
325int rsa_private( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200326 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
327 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000328 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000329 unsigned char *output )
330{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000331 int ret;
332 size_t olen;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000333 mpi T, T1, T2;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200334#if !defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
335 mpi *Vi, *Vf;
336
337 /*
338 * When using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we use blinding values.
339 * Without threading, we just read them directly from the context,
340 * otherwise we make a local copy in order to reduce locking contention.
341 */
342#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
343 mpi Vi_copy, Vf_copy;
344
345 mpi_init( &Vi_copy ); mpi_init( &Vf_copy );
346 Vi = &Vi_copy;
347 Vf = &Vf_copy;
348#else
349 Vi = &ctx->Vi;
350 Vf = &ctx->Vf;
351#endif
352#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000353
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000354 mpi_init( &T ); mpi_init( &T1 ); mpi_init( &T2 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000355
356 MPI_CHK( mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000357 if( mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 )
358 {
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000359 mpi_free( &T );
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000360 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000361 }
362
Paul Bakker0216cc12011-03-26 13:40:23 +0000363#if defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard971f8b82013-10-04 14:10:43 +0200364 ((void) f_rng);
365 ((void) p_rng);
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000366 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN ) );
367#else
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200368 if( f_rng != NULL )
369 {
370 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200371 * Blinding
372 * T = T * Vi mod N
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200373 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200374 MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, Vi, Vf, f_rng, p_rng ) );
375 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, Vi ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200376 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200377 }
Paul Bakkeraab30c12013-08-30 11:00:25 +0200378
379 /*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000380 * faster decryption using the CRT
381 *
382 * T1 = input ^ dP mod P
383 * T2 = input ^ dQ mod Q
384 */
385 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T1, &T, &ctx->DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP ) );
386 MPI_CHK( mpi_exp_mod( &T2, &T, &ctx->DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ ) );
387
388 /*
389 * T = (T1 - T2) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P
390 */
391 MPI_CHK( mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T1, &T2 ) );
392 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->QP ) );
393 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T1, &ctx->P ) );
394
395 /*
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200396 * T = T2 + T * Q
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000397 */
398 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->Q ) );
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200399 MPI_CHK( mpi_add_mpi( &T, &T2, &T1 ) );
Paul Bakkeraab30c12013-08-30 11:00:25 +0200400
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200401 if( f_rng != NULL )
402 {
403 /*
404 * Unblind
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +0200405 * T = T * Vf mod N
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200406 */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200407 MPI_CHK( mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, Vf ) );
Paul Bakkerf451bac2013-08-30 15:37:02 +0200408 MPI_CHK( mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) );
409 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000410#endif
411
412 olen = ctx->len;
413 MPI_CHK( mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) );
414
415cleanup:
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +0000416 mpi_free( &T ); mpi_free( &T1 ); mpi_free( &T2 );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardae102992013-10-04 17:07:12 +0200417#if !defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT) && defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
418 mpi_free( &Vi_copy ); mpi_free( &Vf_copy );
419#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000420
421 if( ret != 0 )
Paul Bakker9d781402011-05-09 16:17:09 +0000422 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000423
424 return( 0 );
425}
426
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000427#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
428/**
429 * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer.
430 *
Paul Bakkerb125ed82011-11-10 13:33:51 +0000431 * \param dst buffer to mask
432 * \param dlen length of destination buffer
433 * \param src source of the mask generation
434 * \param slen length of the source buffer
435 * \param md_ctx message digest context to use
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000436 */
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200437static void mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src,
438 size_t slen, md_context_t *md_ctx )
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000439{
440 unsigned char mask[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
441 unsigned char counter[4];
442 unsigned char *p;
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000443 unsigned int hlen;
444 size_t i, use_len;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000445
446 memset( mask, 0, POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE );
447 memset( counter, 0, 4 );
448
449 hlen = md_ctx->md_info->size;
450
451 // Generate and apply dbMask
452 //
453 p = dst;
454
455 while( dlen > 0 )
456 {
457 use_len = hlen;
458 if( dlen < hlen )
459 use_len = dlen;
460
461 md_starts( md_ctx );
462 md_update( md_ctx, src, slen );
463 md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 );
464 md_finish( md_ctx, mask );
465
466 for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i )
467 *p++ ^= mask[i];
468
469 counter[3]++;
470
471 dlen -= use_len;
472 }
473}
474#endif
475
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100476#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
477/*
478 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function
479 */
480int rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
481 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
482 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100483 int mode,
484 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
485 size_t ilen,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100486 const unsigned char *input,
487 unsigned char *output )
488{
489 size_t olen;
490 int ret;
491 unsigned char *p = output;
492 unsigned int hlen;
493 const md_info_t *md_info;
494 md_context_t md_ctx;
495
496 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 || f_rng == NULL )
497 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
498
499 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100500 if( md_info == NULL )
501 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
502
503 olen = ctx->len;
504 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
505
506 if( olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 || f_rng == NULL )
507 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
508
509 memset( output, 0, olen );
510
511 *p++ = 0;
512
513 // Generate a random octet string seed
514 //
515 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 )
516 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
517
518 p += hlen;
519
520 // Construct DB
521 //
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100522 md( md_info, label, label_len, p );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100523 p += hlen;
524 p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen;
525 *p++ = 1;
526 memcpy( p, input, ilen );
527
528 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
529
530 // maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
531 //
532 mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen,
533 &md_ctx );
534
535 // maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed
536 //
537 mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1,
538 &md_ctx );
539
540 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
541
542 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
543 ? rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200544 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100545}
546#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
547
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200548#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100549/*
550 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function
551 */
552int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
553 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
554 void *p_rng,
555 int mode, size_t ilen,
556 const unsigned char *input,
557 unsigned char *output )
558{
559 size_t nb_pad, olen;
560 int ret;
561 unsigned char *p = output;
562
563 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 || f_rng == NULL )
564 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
565
566 olen = ctx->len;
567
568 if( olen < ilen + 11 )
569 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
570
571 nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen;
572
573 *p++ = 0;
574 if( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
575 {
576 *p++ = RSA_CRYPT;
577
578 while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
579 {
580 int rng_dl = 100;
581
582 do {
583 ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 );
584 } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 );
585
586 // Check if RNG failed to generate data
587 //
588 if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0)
589 return POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret;
590
591 p++;
592 }
593 }
594 else
595 {
596 *p++ = RSA_SIGN;
597
598 while( nb_pad-- > 0 )
599 *p++ = 0xFF;
600 }
601
602 *p++ = 0;
603 memcpy( p, input, ilen );
604
605 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
606 ? rsa_public( ctx, output, output )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200607 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100608}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200609#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100610
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000611/*
612 * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation
613 */
614int rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +0000615 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +0000616 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000617 int mode, size_t ilen,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +0000618 const unsigned char *input,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000619 unsigned char *output )
620{
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000621 switch( ctx->padding )
622 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200623#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000624 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100625 return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen,
626 input, output );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200627#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000628
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000629#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
630 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100631 return rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
632 ilen, input, output );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000633#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000634
635 default:
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000636 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000637 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000638}
639
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100640#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000641/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100642 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000643 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100644int rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200645 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
646 void *p_rng,
647 int mode,
Paul Bakkera43231c2013-02-28 17:33:49 +0100648 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
649 size_t *olen,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100650 const unsigned char *input,
651 unsigned char *output,
652 size_t output_max_len )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000653{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000654 int ret;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100655 size_t ilen, i, pad_len;
656 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done;
Paul Bakker0be82f22012-10-03 20:36:33 +0000657 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000658 unsigned char lhash[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000659 unsigned int hlen;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +0000660 const md_info_t *md_info;
661 md_context_t md_ctx;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100662
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100663 /*
664 * Parameters sanity checks
665 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100666 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
667 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000668
669 ilen = ctx->len;
670
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000671 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +0000672 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000673
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100674 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
675 if( md_info == NULL )
676 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
677
678 /*
679 * RSA operation
680 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000681 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
682 ? rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200683 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000684
685 if( ret != 0 )
686 return( ret );
687
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100688 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100689 * Unmask data and generate lHash
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100690 */
691 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
692
693 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
694
695 /* Generate lHash */
696 md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash );
697
698 /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */
699 mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1,
700 &md_ctx );
701
702 /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */
703 mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen,
704 &md_ctx );
705
706 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
707
708 /*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100709 * Check contents, in "constant-time"
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100710 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000711 p = buf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100712 bad = 0;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000713
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100714 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100715
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100716 p += hlen; /* Skip seed */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100717
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnarda5cfc352013-11-28 15:57:52 +0100718 /* Check lHash */
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100719 for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ )
720 bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100721
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100722 /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer
723 * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */
724 pad_len = 0;
725 pad_done = 0;
726 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ )
727 {
728 pad_done |= p[i];
729 pad_len += ( pad_done == 0 );
730 }
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100731
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100732 p += pad_len;
733 bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100734
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardab44d7e2013-11-29 12:49:44 +0100735 /*
736 * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not
737 * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the
738 * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between
739 * the different error conditions.
740 */
741 if( bad != 0 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100742 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
743
744 if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len)
745 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
746
747 *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
748 memcpy( output, p, *olen );
749
750 return( 0 );
751}
752#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
753
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200754#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100755/*
756 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
757 */
758int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200759 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
760 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100761 int mode, size_t *olen,
762 const unsigned char *input,
763 unsigned char *output,
764 size_t output_max_len)
765{
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100766 int ret;
767 size_t ilen, pad_count = 0, i;
768 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100769 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
770
771 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
772 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
773
774 ilen = ctx->len;
775
776 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
777 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
778
779 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
780 ? rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200781 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100782
783 if( ret != 0 )
784 return( ret );
785
786 p = buf;
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100787 bad = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100788
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100789 /*
790 * Check and get padding len in "constant-time"
791 */
792 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100793
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100794 /* This test does not depend on secret data */
795 if( mode == RSA_PRIVATE )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000796 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100797 bad |= *p++ ^ RSA_CRYPT;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000798
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100799 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
800 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
801 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
802 {
803 pad_done |= ( p[i] == 0 );
804 pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
805 }
Paul Bakkere6ee41f2012-05-19 08:43:48 +0000806
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100807 p += pad_count;
808 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100809 }
810 else
811 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100812 bad |= *p++ ^ RSA_SIGN;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100813
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100814 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
815 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
816 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
817 {
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardfbf09152014-02-03 11:58:55 +0100818 pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100819 pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
820 }
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100821
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100822 p += pad_count;
823 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000824 }
825
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard27290da2013-11-30 13:36:53 +0100826 if( bad )
Paul Bakker8804f692013-02-28 18:06:26 +0100827 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
828
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000829 if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len)
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +0000830 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
Paul Bakker060c5682009-01-12 21:48:39 +0000831
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +0000832 *olen = ilen - (p - buf);
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000833 memcpy( output, p, *olen );
834
835 return( 0 );
836}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200837#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +0000838
839/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100840 * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding
841 */
842int rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200843 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
844 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100845 int mode, size_t *olen,
846 const unsigned char *input,
847 unsigned char *output,
848 size_t output_max_len)
849{
850 switch( ctx->padding )
851 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200852#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100853 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200854 return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen,
855 input, output, output_max_len );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200856#endif
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100857
858#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
859 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200860 return rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0,
861 olen, input, output,
862 output_max_len );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100863#endif
864
865 default:
866 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
867 }
868}
869
870#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
871/*
872 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function
873 */
874int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
875 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
876 void *p_rng,
877 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200878 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100879 unsigned int hashlen,
880 const unsigned char *hash,
881 unsigned char *sig )
882{
883 size_t olen;
884 unsigned char *p = sig;
885 unsigned char salt[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
886 unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0;
887 int ret;
888 size_t msb;
889 const md_info_t *md_info;
890 md_context_t md_ctx;
891
892 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 || f_rng == NULL )
893 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
894
895 olen = ctx->len;
896
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200897 if( md_alg != POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100898 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200899 // Gather length of hash to sign
900 //
901 md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
902 if( md_info == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100903 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200904
905 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100906 }
907
908 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
909 if( md_info == NULL )
910 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
911
912 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
913 slen = hlen;
914
915 if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 )
916 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
917
918 memset( sig, 0, olen );
919
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100920 // Generate salt of length slen
921 //
922 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
923 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
924
925 // Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits
926 //
927 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
928 p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
929 *p++ = 0x01;
930 memcpy( p, salt, slen );
931 p += slen;
932
933 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
934
935 // Generate H = Hash( M' )
936 //
937 md_starts( &md_ctx );
938 md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 );
939 md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
940 md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen );
941 md_finish( &md_ctx, p );
942
943 // Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
944 //
945 if( msb % 8 == 0 )
946 offset = 1;
947
948 // maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
949 //
950 mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, &md_ctx );
951
952 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
953
954 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
955 sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb );
956
957 p += hlen;
958 *p++ = 0xBC;
959
960 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
961 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200962 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100963}
964#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
965
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +0200966#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100967/*
968 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function
969 */
970/*
971 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
972 */
973int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +0200974 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
975 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100976 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200977 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100978 unsigned int hashlen,
979 const unsigned char *hash,
980 unsigned char *sig )
981{
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200982 size_t nb_pad, olen, oid_size = 0;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100983 unsigned char *p = sig;
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200984 const char *oid;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100985
986 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
987 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
988
989 olen = ctx->len;
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200990 nb_pad = olen - 3;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100991
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200992 if( md_alg != POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100993 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200994 const md_info_t *md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
995 if( md_info == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +0100996 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200997
Paul Bakker1c3853b2013-09-10 11:43:44 +0200998 if( oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 )
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +0200999 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1000
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001001 nb_pad -= 10 + oid_size;
1002
1003 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001004 }
1005
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001006 nb_pad -= hashlen;
1007
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001008 if( ( nb_pad < 8 ) || ( nb_pad > olen ) )
1009 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1010
1011 *p++ = 0;
1012 *p++ = RSA_SIGN;
1013 memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad );
1014 p += nb_pad;
1015 *p++ = 0;
1016
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001017 if( md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001018 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001019 memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
1020 }
1021 else
1022 {
1023 /*
1024 * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
1025 * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
1026 * digest Digest }
1027 *
1028 * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
1029 *
1030 * Digest ::= OCTET STRING
1031 */
1032 *p++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE | ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
Paul Bakkerb9cfaa02013-10-11 18:58:55 +02001033 *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001034 *p++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE | ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
Paul Bakkerb9cfaa02013-10-11 18:58:55 +02001035 *p++ = (unsigned char) ( 0x04 + oid_size );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001036 *p++ = ASN1_OID;
Paul Bakkerb9cfaa02013-10-11 18:58:55 +02001037 *p++ = oid_size & 0xFF;
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001038 memcpy( p, oid, oid_size );
1039 p += oid_size;
1040 *p++ = ASN1_NULL;
1041 *p++ = 0x00;
1042 *p++ = ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
1043 *p++ = hashlen;
1044 memcpy( p, hash, hashlen );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001045 }
1046
1047 return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1048 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001049 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001050}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001051#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001052
1053/*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001054 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest
1055 */
1056int rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001057 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001058 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001059 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001060 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001061 unsigned int hashlen,
Paul Bakkerff60ee62010-03-16 21:09:09 +00001062 const unsigned char *hash,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001063 unsigned char *sig )
1064{
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001065 switch( ctx->padding )
1066 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001067#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001068 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001069 return rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001070 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001071#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001072
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001073#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
1074 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001075 return rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001076 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001077#endif
1078
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001079 default:
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001080 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001081 }
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001082}
1083
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001084#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001085/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001086 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001087 */
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001088int rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001089 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1090 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001091 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001092 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001093 unsigned int hashlen,
1094 const unsigned char *hash,
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcc0a9d02013-08-12 11:34:35 +02001095 const unsigned char *sig )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001096{
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001097 int ret;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001098 size_t siglen;
1099 unsigned char *p;
Paul Bakker0be82f22012-10-03 20:36:33 +00001100 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker1fe7d9b2011-11-15 15:26:03 +00001101 unsigned char result[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001102 unsigned char zeros[8];
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001103 unsigned int hlen;
1104 size_t slen, msb;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001105 const md_info_t *md_info;
1106 md_context_t md_ctx;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001107
1108 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 )
1109 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1110
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001111 siglen = ctx->len;
1112
Paul Bakker27fdf462011-06-09 13:55:13 +00001113 if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001114 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001115
1116 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1117 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001118 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001119
1120 if( ret != 0 )
1121 return( ret );
1122
1123 p = buf;
1124
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001125 if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC )
1126 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1127
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001128 if( md_alg != POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001129 {
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001130 // Gather length of hash to sign
1131 //
1132 md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
1133 if( md_info == NULL )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001134 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001135
1136 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001137 }
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001138
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001139 md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
1140 if( md_info == NULL )
1141 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001142
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001143 hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
1144 slen = siglen - hlen - 1;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001145
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001146 memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
Paul Bakker53019ae2011-03-25 13:58:48 +00001147
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001148 // Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
1149 //
1150 msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001151
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001152 // Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
1153 //
1154 if( msb % 8 == 0 )
1155 {
1156 p++;
1157 siglen -= 1;
1158 }
1159 if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) )
1160 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001161
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001162 md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001163
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001164 mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, p + siglen - hlen - 1, hlen, &md_ctx );
Paul Bakker02303e82013-01-03 11:08:31 +01001165
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001166 buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001167
Paul Bakker4de44aa2013-12-31 11:43:01 +01001168 while( p < buf + siglen && *p == 0 )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001169 p++;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001170
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001171 if( p == buf + siglen ||
1172 *p++ != 0x01 )
1173 {
1174 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
1175 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1176 }
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001177
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001178 slen -= p - buf;
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001179
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001180 // Generate H = Hash( M' )
1181 //
1182 md_starts( &md_ctx );
1183 md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
1184 md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
1185 md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen );
1186 md_finish( &md_ctx, result );
Paul Bakker53019ae2011-03-25 13:58:48 +00001187
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001188 md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
Paul Bakker9dcc3222011-03-08 14:16:06 +00001189
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001190 if( memcmp( p + slen, result, hlen ) == 0 )
1191 return( 0 );
1192 else
1193 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1194}
1195#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21 */
Paul Bakker40628ba2013-01-03 10:50:31 +01001196
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001197#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001198/*
1199 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function
1200 */
1201int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001202 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1203 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001204 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001205 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001206 unsigned int hashlen,
1207 const unsigned char *hash,
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcc0a9d02013-08-12 11:34:35 +02001208 const unsigned char *sig )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001209{
1210 int ret;
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001211 size_t len, siglen, asn1_len;
1212 unsigned char *p, *end;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001213 unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001214 md_type_t msg_md_alg;
1215 const md_info_t *md_info;
1216 asn1_buf oid;
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001217
1218 if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
1219 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1220
1221 siglen = ctx->len;
1222
1223 if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) )
1224 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1225
1226 ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
1227 ? rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf )
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001228 : rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf );
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001229
1230 if( ret != 0 )
1231 return( ret );
1232
1233 p = buf;
1234
1235 if( *p++ != 0 || *p++ != RSA_SIGN )
1236 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1237
1238 while( *p != 0 )
1239 {
1240 if( p >= buf + siglen - 1 || *p != 0xFF )
1241 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1242 p++;
1243 }
1244 p++;
1245
1246 len = siglen - ( p - buf );
1247
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001248 if( len == hashlen && md_alg == POLARSSL_MD_NONE )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001249 {
1250 if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) == 0 )
1251 return( 0 );
1252 else
1253 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001254 }
1255
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001256 md_info = md_info_from_type( md_alg );
1257 if( md_info == NULL )
1258 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
1259 hashlen = md_get_size( md_info );
1260
1261 end = p + len;
1262
1263 // Parse the ASN.1 structure inside the PKCS#1 v1.5 structure
1264 //
1265 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
1266 ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
1267 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1268
1269 if( asn1_len + 2 != len )
1270 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1271
1272 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len,
1273 ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | ASN1_SEQUENCE ) ) != 0 )
1274 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1275
1276 if( asn1_len + 6 + hashlen != len )
1277 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1278
1279 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &oid.len, ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
1280 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1281
1282 oid.p = p;
1283 p += oid.len;
1284
1285 if( oid_get_md_alg( &oid, &msg_md_alg ) != 0 )
1286 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1287
1288 if( md_alg != msg_md_alg )
1289 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1290
1291 /*
1292 * assume the algorithm parameters must be NULL
1293 */
1294 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, ASN1_NULL ) ) != 0 )
1295 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1296
1297 if( ( ret = asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &asn1_len, ASN1_OCTET_STRING ) ) != 0 )
1298 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1299
1300 if( asn1_len != hashlen )
1301 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1302
1303 if( memcmp( p, hash, hashlen ) != 0 )
1304 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1305
1306 p += hashlen;
1307
1308 if( p != end )
1309 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );
1310
1311 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001312}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001313#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001314
1315/*
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001316 * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest
1317 */
1318int rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001319 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
1320 void *p_rng,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001321 int mode,
Paul Bakkerc70b9822013-04-07 22:00:46 +02001322 md_type_t md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001323 unsigned int hashlen,
1324 const unsigned char *hash,
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardcc0a9d02013-08-12 11:34:35 +02001325 const unsigned char *sig )
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001326{
1327 switch( ctx->padding )
1328 {
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001329#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001330 case RSA_PKCS_V15:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001331 return rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001332 hashlen, hash, sig );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001333#endif
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001334
1335#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
1336 case RSA_PKCS_V21:
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001337 return rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg,
Paul Bakkerb3869132013-02-28 17:21:01 +01001338 hashlen, hash, sig );
1339#endif
1340
1341 default:
1342 return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
1343 }
1344}
1345
1346/*
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard3053f5b2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02001347 * Copy the components of an RSA key
1348 */
1349int rsa_copy( rsa_context *dst, const rsa_context *src )
1350{
1351 int ret;
1352
1353 dst->ver = src->ver;
1354 dst->len = src->len;
1355
1356 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->N, &src->N ) );
1357 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->E, &src->E ) );
1358
1359 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->D, &src->D ) );
1360 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->P, &src->P ) );
1361 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->Q, &src->Q ) );
1362 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->DP, &src->DP ) );
1363 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->DQ, &src->DQ ) );
1364 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->QP, &src->QP ) );
1365
1366 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->RN, &src->RN ) );
1367 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->RP, &src->RP ) );
1368 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->RQ, &src->RQ ) );
1369
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard971f8b82013-10-04 14:10:43 +02001370#if !defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +02001371 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->Vi, &src->Vi ) );
1372 MPI_CHK( mpi_copy( &dst->Vf, &src->Vf ) );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard971f8b82013-10-04 14:10:43 +02001373#endif
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +02001374
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard3053f5b2013-08-14 13:39:57 +02001375 dst->padding = src->padding;
1376 dst->hash_id = src->padding;
1377
1378cleanup:
1379 if( ret != 0 )
1380 rsa_free( dst );
1381
1382 return( ret );
1383}
1384
1385/*
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001386 * Free the components of an RSA key
1387 */
1388void rsa_free( rsa_context *ctx )
1389{
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard971f8b82013-10-04 14:10:43 +02001390#if !defined(POLARSSL_RSA_NO_CRT)
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnardea53a552013-09-10 13:29:30 +02001391 mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); mpi_free( &ctx->Vf );
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard971f8b82013-10-04 14:10:43 +02001392#endif
Paul Bakker6c591fa2011-05-05 11:49:20 +00001393 mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); mpi_free( &ctx->RN );
1394 mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); mpi_free( &ctx->DP );
1395 mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); mpi_free( &ctx->P ); mpi_free( &ctx->D );
1396 mpi_free( &ctx->E ); mpi_free( &ctx->N );
Paul Bakkerc9965dc2013-09-29 14:58:17 +02001397
1398#if defined(POLARSSL_THREADING_C)
1399 polarssl_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex );
1400#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001401}
1402
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001403#if defined(POLARSSL_SELF_TEST)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001404
Paul Bakker40e46942009-01-03 21:51:57 +00001405#include "polarssl/sha1.h"
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001406
1407/*
1408 * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes
1409 */
1410#define KEY_LEN 128
1411
1412#define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \
1413 "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \
1414 "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \
1415 "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \
1416 "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \
1417 "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \
1418 "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \
1419 "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79"
1420
1421#define RSA_E "10001"
1422
1423#define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \
1424 "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \
1425 "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \
1426 "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \
1427 "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \
1428 "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \
1429 "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \
1430 "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D"
1431
1432#define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \
1433 "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \
1434 "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \
1435 "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57"
1436
1437#define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \
1438 "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \
1439 "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \
1440 "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF"
1441
1442#define RSA_DP "C1ACF567564274FB07A0BBAD5D26E298" \
1443 "3C94D22288ACD763FD8E5600ED4A702D" \
1444 "F84198A5F06C2E72236AE490C93F07F8" \
1445 "3CC559CD27BC2D1CA488811730BB5725"
1446
1447#define RSA_DQ "4959CBF6F8FEF750AEE6977C155579C7" \
1448 "D8AAEA56749EA28623272E4F7D0592AF" \
1449 "7C1F1313CAC9471B5C523BFE592F517B" \
1450 "407A1BD76C164B93DA2D32A383E58357"
1451
1452#define RSA_QP "9AE7FBC99546432DF71896FC239EADAE" \
1453 "F38D18D2B2F0E2DD275AA977E2BF4411" \
1454 "F5A3B2A5D33605AEBBCCBA7FEB9F2D2F" \
1455 "A74206CEC169D74BF5A8C50D6F48EA08"
1456
1457#define PT_LEN 24
1458#define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \
1459 "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD"
1460
Paul Bakkerfef3c5a2013-12-11 13:36:30 +01001461#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001462static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001463{
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001464 size_t i;
1465
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001466 if( rng_state != NULL )
1467 rng_state = NULL;
1468
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001469 for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
1470 output[i] = rand();
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001471
Paul Bakkera3d195c2011-11-27 21:07:34 +00001472 return( 0 );
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001473}
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001474#endif
Paul Bakker545570e2010-07-18 09:00:25 +00001475
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001476/*
1477 * Checkup routine
1478 */
1479int rsa_self_test( int verbose )
1480{
Paul Bakkerfef3c5a2013-12-11 13:36:30 +01001481#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15)
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001482 size_t len;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001483 rsa_context rsa;
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001484 unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN];
1485 unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN];
1486 unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN];
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001487#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
1488 unsigned char sha1sum[20];
1489#endif
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001490
Paul Bakker21eb2802010-08-16 11:10:02 +00001491 rsa_init( &rsa, RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001492
1493 rsa.len = KEY_LEN;
1494 mpi_read_string( &rsa.N , 16, RSA_N );
1495 mpi_read_string( &rsa.E , 16, RSA_E );
1496 mpi_read_string( &rsa.D , 16, RSA_D );
1497 mpi_read_string( &rsa.P , 16, RSA_P );
1498 mpi_read_string( &rsa.Q , 16, RSA_Q );
1499 mpi_read_string( &rsa.DP, 16, RSA_DP );
1500 mpi_read_string( &rsa.DQ, 16, RSA_DQ );
1501 mpi_read_string( &rsa.QP, 16, RSA_QP );
1502
1503 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001504 polarssl_printf( " RSA key validation: " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001505
1506 if( rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 ||
1507 rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 )
1508 {
1509 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001510 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001511
1512 return( 1 );
1513 }
1514
1515 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001516 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001517
1518 memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN );
1519
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001520 if( rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, PT_LEN,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001521 rsa_plaintext, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1522 {
1523 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001524 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001525
1526 return( 1 );
1527 }
1528
1529 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001530 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001531
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001532 if( rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, RSA_PRIVATE, &len,
Paul Bakker060c5682009-01-12 21:48:39 +00001533 rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted,
Paul Bakker23986e52011-04-24 08:57:21 +00001534 sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 )
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001535 {
1536 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001537 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001538
1539 return( 1 );
1540 }
1541
1542 if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 )
1543 {
1544 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001545 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001546
1547 return( 1 );
1548 }
1549
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001550#if defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C)
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001551 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001552 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 data sign : " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001553
1554 sha1( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum );
1555
Paul Bakkeraab30c12013-08-30 11:00:25 +02001556 if( rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL, RSA_PRIVATE, POLARSSL_MD_SHA1, 0,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001557 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1558 {
1559 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001560 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001561
1562 return( 1 );
1563 }
1564
1565 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001566 polarssl_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001567
Paul Bakker548957d2013-08-30 10:30:02 +02001568 if( rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, RSA_PUBLIC, POLARSSL_MD_SHA1, 0,
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001569 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 )
1570 {
1571 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001572 polarssl_printf( "failed\n" );
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001573
1574 return( 1 );
1575 }
1576
1577 if( verbose != 0 )
Paul Bakker7dc4c442014-02-01 22:50:26 +01001578 polarssl_printf( "passed\n\n" );
Paul Bakker5690efc2011-05-26 13:16:06 +00001579#endif /* POLARSSL_SHA1_C */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001580
1581 rsa_free( &rsa );
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001582#else /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker3e41fe82013-09-15 17:42:50 +02001583 ((void) verbose);
Paul Bakker48377d92013-08-30 12:06:24 +02001584#endif /* POLARSSL_PKCS1_V15 */
Paul Bakker5121ce52009-01-03 21:22:43 +00001585 return( 0 );
1586}
1587
1588#endif
1589
1590#endif